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Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical
Perspective
By Michele Benedetto*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Naing Tun walked into an immigration courtroom
seeking to remain in the United States, he expected to plead his case
before a neutral arbiter. Mr. Tun had painstakingly compiled
documents and gathered witnesses to prove his claim for asylum. He
had prepared himself to revisit difficult memories of the torture and
abuse he had suffered under government officials in his home
country, Burma.
Unfortunately for Mr. Tun, he appeared before an
overworked immigration judge who personified the failures that exist
in United States immigration courts. The immigration judge made a
series of conclusions regarding Mr. Tun's testimony later found to be
erroneous by an appellate court.1 The judge also improperly excluded
evidence and witness testimony submitted by Mr. Tun. Most
alarmingly, the judge disregarded evidence showing that the court-
appointed translator did not correctly translate Mr. Tun's testimony.
*Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California. J.D., New York University School of Law. The author once served as a
judicial intern in a New York City immigration court. I am grateful to Professor
Anthony Thompson, Professor Philip Schrag, and Professor Andrew Perlman for
their helpful feedback on earlier drafts. I wish to thank my colleagues at Golden
Gate University School of Law for their support, particularly Eric Christiansen and
David Oppenheimer, and research assistants Susana Garcia, Julie Mercer, and
Gabriel Neises. This article is dedicated to Maryellen and Jim Benedetto, and to the
Honorable Napoleon A. Jones, Jr., whose service on the federal bench exemplifies
the best ofjudicial ethics.
1. Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1027-29 (8th Cir. 2007).
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The judge then relied on the erroneous translation to deny Mr. Tun's
claim for asylum.
2
Mr. Tun possessed the resources to appeal the decision of the
immigration judge. Without the intervention of the Eighth Circuit.
Court of Appeals, who criticized the conduct of the immigration
judge, Mr. Tun would surely have been returned to Burma to face
further persecution. 3
Najah Georges Elias faced a similarly challenging experience
in immigration court. Seeking to avoid removal to Iraq, where he
believed he would be persecuted for his religion, Mr. Elias requested
asylum in the United States. During his hearing, the immigration
judge addressed Mr. Elias in a manner later described by the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals as "argumentative, sarcastic, and sometimes
arguably insulting."4 The court noted the immigration judge appeared
to "badger" Mr. Elias at times during the hearing, "likely making
[Mr. Elias] more nervous and affecting his testimony." 5 As a result of
the immigration judge's hostility and bias toward Mr. Elias, the court
vacated Mr. Elias's removal order and remanded his case for
consideration before a different immigration judge. 6 As the court
stated, "[Mr. Elias] was entitled to a fair hearing, but did not receive
one."
7
Mr. Tun's and Mr. Elias's experiences represent a widespread
problem. Legal scholars, appellate judges, practitioners, and even the
former United States Attorney General have expressed growing
concern regarding the status of the immigration court system. 8 As
Judge Richard Posner noted in 2005, the adjudication of cases by
2. Id. at 1030.
3. Id.
4. Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2007).
5. Id. at 452.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 452-53.
8. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at Al; Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political
Response to Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2006);
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005); Memorandum to
Immigration Judges from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (Jan. 9, 2006),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-memo-ijs.pdf.
immigration judges has "fallen below the minimum standards of
legal justice." 9 Later that year, the New York Times reported that
federal appeals courts "repeatedly excoriated" immigration judges for
a "pattern of biased and incoherent decisions."' 10
Scholars have accurately termed the situation a "crisis" and
are calling for major structural reforms.'" For example, in the
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal in Fall 2006, Sydenham B.
Alexander III outlined evidence showing that immigration courts are
failing to properly apply the law. 12  Mr. Alexander proposed a
political solution to the problem, suggesting the creation of a political
campaign designed to "force needed changes to the immigration
court system."' 3  More recently, in a Stanford Law Review article,
Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip
G. Schrag analyzed data from asylum offices, immigration courts, the
Board of Immigration Appeals, and the United States Courts of
Appeal showing remarkable inconsistencies in grant rates for asylum
decisions among immigration courts, and even among judges in the
same courthouse. 14  Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and
Schrag were "troubled" by the ramifications of their findings, which
indicated an asylum applicant's case is "seriously influenced by a
spin of the wheel" assigning his case to a particular judge. '5
Additional evidence of the problem can be found in cases
reviewed by the circuit courts.' 6 Many immigration judges appear to
be determining cases in a haphazard manner, with decisions
influenced more by personal preferences than by careful
9. Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830.
10. Liptak, supra note 8.
11. Alexander, supra note 8, at 11; see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REv. 295 (2007); Eliot
Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on America's
Asylum System, 2 NW J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 1, 1 (2007) ("That the American asylum
system has fallen into disrepute is no longer a significantly contested point of
debate."); Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of
the Board of Immigration Appeals's Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 481, 507 (2005).
12. Alexander, supra note 8, at 11-36.
13. Id. at 45.
14. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 296, 332.
15. Id. at 378.
16. See infra Part Il.E; see also cases cited infra note 149.
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consideration of facts and law. 17 As a result, litigants in immigration
court can no longer be assured of ethical and accurate decision-
making when they present their case to an immigration judge.
Scholars and reform advocates have extensively considered the
causes of this problem and the resulting surge of appeals to the circuit
courts: contributing factors include recent structural changes to the
immigration court system, lack of resources for immigration judges,
and pressure on judges to decide cases expeditiously.1 8  When an
element of the American judicial system is consistently adjudicating
cases using biased or legally incorrect reasoning, the result is indeed
a "crisis."
The purpose of this article is to suggest a new lens through
which to examine the crisis in immigration courts: judicial ethics.
Ethical considerations frequently play a decisive role in the
resolution of immigration cases, in part because the outcomes for
litigants in immigration courts can depend almost entirely on the
attitude of the judge. Accordingly, the acknowledged crisis in
immigration courts has severe implications for judicial ethics.
Because the term "judicial ethics" encompasses a broad array of
principles, this article will narrow its focus to bias and incompetence
on the part of immigration judges in the courtroom.
Part II considers the unique structure of the inmmigration
court, focusing on the current disciplinary procedures for
immigration judges and Attorney General John Ashcroft's
"streamlining" reforms of 2003. Part III then discusses the existence
17. See, e.g., Sun v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, No. 05-4447, 2007 WL
2705601 at *3 (2d. Cir. Sept. 14, 2007) (removing an immigration judge from a
case because her comments to the asylum applicant and her conduct during the
hearing created "substantial uncertainty as to whether the record below was fairly
and reliably developed"); see also Nina Bernstein, Judge Who Chastised Weeping
Asylum Seeker Is Taken Off Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at B 1.
18. The causes of the "surge" in appeals to the circuit courts have been much
examined by legal scholars. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8, at 9-10; John R.B.
Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 13, 14-15 (2006-2007);
Martin S. Krezalek, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process Rights
While Preserving the BIA's Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO IMMIGR. L.J.
277, 289 (2007); Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, Overwhelmed Circuit Courts
Lashing Out at the BIA and Selected Immigration Judges: Is Streamlining to
Blame?, 82 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2005, 2005-07 (Dec. 19, 2005).
of an ethical crisis through statistics showing inconsistent decisions
and cases reviewed by circuit courts illustrating judicial bias and
incompetence. Part IV next examines causes of such conduct and
pending solutions to the problem. Part IV pays special attention to the
Attorney General's proposed "Codes of Conduct for Immigration
Judges and BIA Members." While some would argue the mere
existence of this suggested standard of conduct is promising, Part IV
explains that the new Codes of Conduct lack both specificity and
enforceability.
This article not only analyzes the existing crisis with an eye
toward the ethical implications of the challenges facing immigration
courts, but also offers proposals designed to encourage unbiased and
competent behavior on the immigration bench. Accordingly, Part V
recommends practical reforms in response to the ethical nature of this
crisis. Implementation of these reforms will initiate the process of
restoring the ethical integrity of the immigration bench.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE IMMIGRATION COURT SYSTEM
A. The Players: Members of the Executive Branch
Immigration judges and their courtrooms do not operate as
members of the Judicial Branch of government. Because immigration
issues often involve "especially sensitive political functions that
implicate questions of foreign relations,"' 9 courts recognize that the
decisions permitting or preventing foreign nationals from
immigrating are "frequently of a character more appropriate to either
the Legislature or the Executive [Branch] than to the Judiciary." 20
Hence, the Executive Branch is responsible for the
establishment of policy and procedures relating to immigration
proceedings. This responsibility has been entrusted to the Department
19. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (noting that it is a sovereign power of government
to "exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public
interests require such exclusion").
20. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); see also Robert M. Cannon, A
Reevaluation of the Relationship of the Administrative Procedure Act to Asylum
Hearings: The Ramifications of the American Baptist Churches' Settlement, 5
ADMIN. L.J. 713, 716 (1991).
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of Justice ("DOJ") since 1940 and is delegated to the Attorney
General.2' Currently, immigration judges are members of the
Department of Justice's Executive Office of Immigration Review
("EOIR"), an agency within the DOJ created in 1983.22
Under authority delegated by the Attorney General, EOIR
"interprets and administers" immigration law by "conducting
immigration court proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative
hearings." 23 EOIR includes the Office of the Director, the Board of
Immigration Appeals, the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge
("OCIJ"), and the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing
Officer. 24
The OCIJ manages the fifty-three immigration courts located
around the country.2 5  Immigration judges ("IJs") adjudicate
individual immigration cases and their decisions are usually
unpublished oral decisions recorded on tapes. 26  The Attorney
General sets the qualifications and terms of office for IJs, who are
paid salaries of $109,720 to $149,200.27 The majority of judges
appointed to the immigration bench in the initial years of EOIR's
existence fit the same profile: white, male judges in their forties,
fifties, or early sixties, who nearly all formerly worked for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") prosecuting
immigration cases. 28
21. See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853 § 327, 54 Stat. 1137,
1150-51 (1940); see also Alexander, supra note 8, at 8 n.45.
22. Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Missions
and Functions Statement [hereinafter DOJ Mission Statement], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/eoir.htm#content (signed by John Ashcroft
Nov. 19, 2004).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS
IMPROVEMENT (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06771 .pdf.
26. Alexander, supra note 8, at 9.
27. Id.
28. Telephone Interview with anonymous former IJ, July 25, 2007 [hereinafter
Former IJ Interview]. The current immigration bench is more diverse. Id.
B. The Appointment Process
The appointment process for immigration judges differs
widely from the process for federal, state, and administrative law
judges. Federal judges are nominated by the President and appointed
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 29 In addition to public
confirmation hearings before members of the Senate, federal judicial
nominees undergo investigations by the FBI, Department of Justice,
and the American Bar Association ("ABA"). 30 Theoretically, this
type of vetting process helps to ensure that only "ethical" persons
become Article III judges, thus minimizing the occurrence of
unethical behavior on the federal bench.3'
State judges can be either appointed or elected, depending
on the process prescribed by the individual state. 32  State judges
generally do not undergo confirmation hearings, but appointed judges
can be subject to approval by designated commissions. 33
The selection of administrative law judges ("ALJs") to work
in federal agencies is entrusted to the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management. Candidates for ALJ positions must meet licensing and
experience requirements, and must pass a competitive administrative
law judge examination to qualify for an ALJ position.34 To be
29. Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary,
Appendix I. Tiers of Federal Judges-Article III and Statutory Federal Judges, Their
Numbers, Selection, and Tenure, 95 GEO L.J. 1009, 1015 (2007).
30. THOMAS E. BAKER, THE GOOD JUDGE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY 52 (1989).
31. Id. ("[T]he appointment process performs double duty as a mechanism for
keeping the already corrupt, infirm, or unable person off the bench and as a screen
to select judges who are, at once, independent and committed to the separation of
powers and federalism.").
32. California state judges, for example, can be appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the commission on judicial appointments, or can be elected through a
nonpartisan election. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CALIFORNIA: CURRENT
METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION, available at http://
www.ajs.org/js/CA_methods.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
33. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SUMMARY OF INITIAL ELECTION
METHODS, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/SummaryInitialSelection.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2008).
34. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, QUALIFICATION STANDARD
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE POSITIONS, available at http://
www.opm.gov/qualifications/alj/alj.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
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considered, an applicant must be a licensed attorney with seven years
of litigation or administrative trial experience.
In contrast, immigration judges are appointed by the
Attorney General and act under his control and supervision. 35
Immigration judges traditionally are individuals with immigration
law expertise, who are chosen through a competitive civil service
process. 36 Those applying for the positions are vetted by EOIR, and
EOIR's recommendations are forwarded to the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General, where they are usually approved.37 Contrary to
the procedure for federal judges, the appointment process for
immigration judges is not subject to a broad system of checks and
balances; rather, the Executive Branch alone is responsible for the
appointment of immigration judges. Unlike administrative law
judges, immigration judges historically have not been required to
pass a competitive exam to be appointed to the bench.3 8
The appointment process for IJs changed under the
leadership of Attorney General John Ashcroft and has been criticized
in recent months for lacking public visibility. 39  The lack of
transparency in the process is an especially important issue in light of
recent revelations that the Bush administration has consistently
appointed individuals with little or no immigration experience to the
immigration bench.40 There are allegations that Attorney General
Ashcroft and his successor, Alberto Gonzales, politicized the
appointment process and promoted the hiring of unqualified
individuals, even though the DOJ explicitly requires seven years of
35. 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(b)(4) (2006); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 1
n.2.
36. See GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 n.6.
37. Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration Judgeships
Political, LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 2007.
38. Attorney General Gonzales recently directed the EOIR Director to
"[a]dminister an examination for newly-appointed immigration judges with respect
to their familiarity with key principles of immigration law before they begin to
adjudicate matters ." Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge [hereinafter Authorities
Delegated to the Director], 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673, 53,677 (Sept. 20, 2007) (codified
at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003.0(b)(1)(vi) (2007)).
39. See, e.g., Schwartz & McLure, supra note 37.
40. Id.
relevant legal experience.41 While testifying before Congress for the
Department of Justice, former aide to the Attorney General Monica
Goodling acknowledged that she "evaluated candidates based on her
perception of their political loyalties" and "asked inappropriate
questions of many applicants for career jobs at the department,"
including immigration judge positions.42
One veteran immigration attorney, who was passed over for
two judgeships in favor of political friends of the Bush
administration, has even sued the DOJ for discrimination.
43
Responding to the lawsuit, the DOJ stated that "all but four
immigration judges chosen from late 2003 to 2006[] were hired
without public competition., 44 Half of the judges chosen since 2004
did not have any immigration experience. 45
In a recently publicized example, a newly appointed
immigration judge in Lancaster, California, had minimal immigration
experience when he was appointed to the immigration bench; in the
nine years prior to his appointment, Judge Ted White had worked as
a public defender and as an administrative law judge.46 Judge White
resigned shortly before his one-year probation period was completed
but not before attorneys recognized that "he didn't really understand
the law He often seemed to rely on trial attorneys [i.e., government
41. See Scott Horton, Meltdown at DOJ: The Story of the Immigration Judge
Scam, HARPER'S, May 30, 2007, available at http://
www.harpers.org/archive/2007/05/hbc-90000186; see also Dan Eggen, Officials
Say Justice Dept. Based Hires on Politics Before Goodling Tenure, WASH. POST,
May 26, 2007, at A2; David Johnston & Eric Lipton, Bush Reaffirms His Support
for Gonzales, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at A17.
42. Schwartz & McLure, supra note 37, at *2. Retired IJ Bruce Einhorn,
noting the shift to politically motivated appointments, stated that "A lot of my
colleagues in [the immigration] bar seemed to have applications pending for years
without ever being interviewed while people with contacts at the White House were
being appointed at warp speed." Id. at *30.
43. Id. at *50
44. Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on
GOP Ties, WASH. POST, June 11, 2007, at Al.
45. Id.
46. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigration Judge Takes Oath in
Lancaster (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/White.pdf.
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prosecutors] for guidance. 47 In addition to raising serious questions
about judicial competence, Judge White's appointment highlighted
the need for a more visible selection process for immigration judges.
Judges and immigration experts have sharply criticized the
DOJ for these appointment practices. For example, a deputy director
from the American Immigration Lawyers Association ("AILA")
voiced concern that "when we start seeing people who look like
[they're fulfilling] someone's political debt get these positions, it
starts to become disturbing. 48
In response to such criticism, the Attorney General changed
the appointment process. In April 2007, the DOJ implemented a new
hiring program requiring "public announcements of open positions
and detailed evaluations and interviews, with a final decision still in
the hands of the Attorney General." An open appointment process
will hopefully bring more experienced candidates to these positions,
and will increase the transparency of the selection process.
C. Immigration Proceedings
A fair appointment process for immigration judges is
particularly important because an IJ often makes the ultimate
determination of an immigrant's fate. An individual seeking relief
from deportation usually enters the murky world of immigration law
with a "removal proceeding" initiated by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS"). If a foreign national is found to be
removable, he may be eligible to apply for various forms of
discretionary relief, including voluntary departure, cancellation of
removal, and asylum. 50 To avoid deportation through discretionary
relief, an immigrant must prove that he is eligible for such relief
47. Sandra Hernandez, Immigration Judge's Sudden Resignation Raises
Eyebrows, L.A. DAILY J., July 10, 2007, available at www.bibdaily.com/index.cgi
(enter keyword "pistol" and search in titles for Pistol-Packin' IJAbruptly Quits). It
was revealed after his resignation that Judge White kept handguns and ammunition
in his judicial chambers, conduct that is prohibited by the DOJ. Id.
48. Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44.
49. Id.
50. For a description of these forms of discretionary relief, see Executive
Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Forms of Relief
from Removal (Aug. 3, 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.htm.
under the law and that he "deserves such relief as an exercise in
discretion." 5 1
Proceedings usually result in an evidentiary hearing held
before an immigration judge, in which the IJ has discretion to
determine whether the applicant is eligible to remain in the United
States.5 2 This hearing is critical for the applicant seeking to avoid
deportation. For many persons, the immigration court hearing
represents their only chance to present evidence supporting their
case.
53
Decisions made by immigration judges are not subject to the
ordinary procedures of judicial review. 54  If either the foreign
national or the United States disagrees with the immigration judge's
determination, they may petition for review with the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA serves as the second level of
adjudicators within the Department of Justice, and issues unpublished
but written decisions.55 In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft
restructured the BIA, which now has eleven members hearing
appeals from decisions handed down by immigration judges. 56
BIA decisions may be further appealed to the U.S. Courts of
Appeal. In theory, the Supreme Court could accept a petition for
certiorari from an immigrant ordered to be removed. In practice,
however, the Supreme Court has only accepted such review in a
"handful" of cases.57 Judicial impartiality and fair proceedings are
therefore especially important, particularly for immigrants facing
persecution in their home countries. A loss in immigration court
resulting in removal could be a "death sentence for some asylum
51. Id.
52. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 369, 371-2 (2006); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 308-
09.
53. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 326.
54. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) ("[T]he power
over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial
review.").
55. Alexander, supra note 8, at 9.
56. DOJ Mission Statement, supra note 22. For a more detailed discussion of
Ashcroft's reforms, see infra Part II.E.
57. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 310.
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seekers whose cases are wrongly denied.""8
D. Ashcroft's Reforms: The Streamlining Regulations
In the late 1990s, the BIA's delayed response in reviewing
removal orders created concern that foreign nationals were filing
appeals merely to remain longer in the United States.59 In 2002 and
2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft implemented a series of
reforms in an attempt to reduce the delays and the backlog of cases in
the BIA.6 °
One of Ashcroft's reform measures altered the procedures of
the BIA appellate process. The standard BIA process had operated in
a style much like the federal appellate courts; BIA members decided
cases as three-member panels and issued reasoned written opinions. 61
Ashcroft's streamlined regulations eliminated the BIA's three-
member panels except in a few categories of cases. 62 Additionally,
the BIA was ordered to cease writing opinions and instead issue a
single-member affirmance without opinion if the IJ's decision should
be upheld. 63
As he proclaimed the importance of decreasing the BIA
backlog, Ashcroft's reforms went one step further. He decreased the
number of positions on the BIA from twenty-three to eleven.64
Although Ashcroft refused to explain what criteria he would use to
determine which members would be removed, he was later criticized
for selecting those BIA members most likely to rule in favor of
foreign nationals for removal.65 In fact, "liberal board members
58. Id. at 327.
59. Alexander, supra note 8, at 11-12.
60. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3)
[hereinafter Procedural Reforms].
61. Legomsky, supra note 52, at 375.
62. Procedural Reforms, supra note 60, at 54,880; see also Legomsky supra
note 52, at 375.
63. Procedural Reforms, supra note 60, at 54,885-86, see also Legomsky
supra note 52, at 375.
64. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 352.
65. Legomsky, supra note 52, at 376. According to one board member who left
shortly before the changes occurred, "It was a purge. They brought in people who
appear to have been specifically targeted, as those are the ones that
were removed.- 66 The majority of removed BIA members had prior
work experience in private practice, immigration advocacy
organizations, and academia.67
Ashcroft's reforms immediately created one desired effect:
the BIA backlog has significantly diminished. In 2003, 17% of IJ
decisions were appealed to the BIA.68  The percentage of BIA
appeals has decreased each year since the reforms were implemented,
and only 9% of decisions were appealed to the BIA in 2006.69 The
number of "summary affirmances," in which Board members affirm
IJ decisions without stating whether they agree with the IJ's
have all worked from one side of the issue, the government perspective." David
Adams, Courts Overwhelmed by Immigration Cases, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May
25, 2006, available at http://
www.sptimes.com/2006/05/29/Worldandnation/Courtsoverwhelmedby.shtml.
This criticism is supported by data showing that the most "liberal" members of the
BIA were fired. Legomsky, supra note 52, at 376, 376 nn.38, 39 (citing Peter J.
Levinson, The Facade of Quasi-Justicial Independence in Immigration Appellate
Adjudications, 9 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004)).
66. Telephone Interview with Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat'l Ass'n of
Immigration Judges (Sept. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Marks Interview]. (The National
Association of Immigration Judges is a union.)
67. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 353. Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales announced in September 2006 that he would add four member positions
to the BIA. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration
Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06-ag-520.html. Notably, he "did not suggest
that the members who had been appointed under a Democratic Administration and
removed to other jobs would be restored to the Board." Ramji-Nogales et al., supra
note 11, at 386-87.
68. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2006 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK A2 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 YEARBOOK], available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy06syb.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
69. Id. One reason for the decrease in appeals may be recognition on the part
of litigants that appealing to the BIA will almost inevitably result in an affirmation
of the IJ's decision, requiring a subsequent appeal to the Circuit Courts. Without the
resources to successfully appeal a decision to the Circuit Courts, litigants may be
choosing not to appeal at all. See Cruz, supra note 11, at 508 ("[M]any immigrants
lack the financial means to pursue an appeal to the circuit court, to file a motion to
reconsider, and to litigate upon remand."). This logic, of course, was part of the
goal of the streamlining process.
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reasoning, increased from 3% to 60% in a seven-month period during
2002.70 Moreover, BIA members increasingly held in favor of the
government and against foreign nationals; Board decisions granting
relief to foreign nationals fell from 25% to 10%. 71
However, the BIA still suffers from a heavy workload. In
2006, the eleven members of the BIA completed 41,479 appeals.72
According to Chief Judge of the Second Circuit John M. Walker,
"For the BIA to keep current on its docket, even with streamlining so
that the disposition is by a single judge, each judge must dispose of
nearly 4,000 cases a year-or about 80 per week-a virtually impossible
task. ' 73
Ashcroft's reforms have been heavily criticized for lessening
the quality of work performed by the BIA.7 4 Indeed, immigration
judges themselves recognize the problems inherent in this limited
review process. The President of the National Association of
Immigration Judges, Dana Leigh Marks, noted that many
immigration judges were trained to render oral decisions from the
bench, with no need to "make it formal and pretty" because the BIA
70. Alexander, supra note 8, at 12; DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT
app. 25 (2003),
http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf; see also
Martin S. Krezalek, Note, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process
Rights While Preserving the BIA's Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO.
IMMGR. L.J. 277, 279 (2007) (arguing that summary affirmances potentially violate
the rights of foreign nationals).
71. Alexander, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that "these changes increased by
thousands the number of noncitizens whose administrative appeals were rejected
without written explanation").
72. 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at S2.
73. Statement of Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Apr. 3, 2006, at 3
[hereinafter Walker Statement], available at http://
www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=18996 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007); see
also Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 378 (1st Cir. 2003) (board member decided
50 cases on October 31, 2002, a "rate of one every ten minutes over the course of a
nine-hour day"); Alexander, supra note 8, at 21.
74. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8, at 21. Immigration attorney Kerry Bretz
remarked, "Motion practice at the BIA is a joke. I get denials where it's clear they
haven't even read the motions." Mark Hamblett, Extraordinary Measures Reduce
Circuit's Immigration Case Backlog, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 2007, at 1.
would serve as the "polishers" for the decisions. 75 Now, "the BIA is
issuing all of these affirmances without opinion and we have no
resources to do a top-notch job from the beginning."'7 6
In addition to the structural impact of these reforms, the
changes raise considerable ethical implications. For example, the task
of reviewing both the decisions and the behavior of immigration
judges has fallen on the circuit courts because BIA members are less
able to thoroughly review IJ determinations. But circuit courts were
not designed-and should not be required-to monitor ethical behavior.
The potential for biased or incompetent behavior has significantly
increased since circuit courts simply cannot review every
immigration case for judicial misconduct.
Ashcroft's reforms can be credited for bringing the crisis in
the immigration courts to light: the BIA is no longer "cleaning up"
immigration judges' improper decisions, and appellate justices and
the public are now more aware of the wide scope of the problem.77
However, while the reforms may indeed raise public consciousness,
unethical behavior is harming litigants on an ongoing basis.
E. Current Disciplinary Procedures for Immigration Judges
Neither the BIA nor the courts of appeal are designed to
monitor complaints of ethical misconduct in immigration courts. In
2003 the EOIR Director established a procedure for evaluating
behavioral complaints against immigration judges.78 Under this
system, EOIR and the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge are
responsible for monitoring complaints, and complaint reports are
75. Marks Interview, supra note 66.
76. Alexander, supra note 8, at 12-13 (citing Solomon Moore & Ann M.
Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal Appellate Courts: As Caseloads
Skyrocket, Judges Blame the Work Done by the Board of Immigration Appeals,
L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at 1).
77. Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.
78. GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 14. Although EOIR and the OCIJ
established an "Immigration Court Evaluation Program" ("ICEP") in 1997 to
evaluate court performance, the individual hearing decisions of judges are "the only
aspect of court evaluation that are not evaluated." Id. at 13. The ICEP focuses
instead on the "courts' organizational structure, caseload, and workflow processes
to assess the efficiency of the court in accomplishing its mission." Id.
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"generated on a monthly basis for internal use only.",79 The reports
are sent to the EOIR Director, and are intended to provide a
"centralized and comprehensive compilation of written and oral
complaints" regarding immigration judges' conduct on the bench, as
well as the status of the complaints. 80 Pursuant to this structure, the
EOIR Director has the responsibility to monitor the patterns of
misconduct on the part of immigration judges.
Complaints about the conduct of individual immigration
judges are brought to the OCIJ orally or in writing, and are usually
sent to the OCIJ by the Assistant Chief Immigration Judge ("ACIJ")
with supervisory authority over the judge in question. 81 Beginning in
2007, complaints may also be sent to the individual serving in the
newly created Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for Conduct and
Professionalism position. 82  Complaints may be submitted by a
variety of persons, including "immigrants, the immigrants' attorneys,
DHS trial attorneys, other immigration judges, other court staff, OCIJ
headquarters staff, and others." 83  The OCIJ notifies the EOIR
Director of a complaint filed against an immigration judge, even
before the OCIJ has an opportunity to verify the accuracy of the
claim. 84 Thus, the EOIR Director is presumably well-informed: in
addition to receiving monthly compilations of written and oral
complaints, the EOIR Director is also notified of individual
complaints as they arise.
Despite the monitoring role of the EOIR Director, and the
newly created advisory role of the ACIJ for Conduct and
Professionalism, the ACIJ with supervisory authority over the judge
79. Id at 14.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 15.
82. This position, created in 2007 as part of Attorney General Gonzales's
reforms, is designed to "review[] and monitor[] all complaints against immigration
judges" and help "ensure that investigations of complaints are concluded as
efficiently as possible." AILA-EOIR Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions, Apr. 11,
2007, at 3 [hereinafter AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/eoiraila041107.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
Notably, however, the ACIJ for Conduct and Professionalism does not hold
disciplinary authority over Js. See id. (listing the position's responsibilities as
monitoring, reviewing, and tracking all complaints).
83. GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 27.
84. Id. at 28.
is directly responsible for addressing most complaints. 85  In an
August 2006 report, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO")
disclosed that between fiscal years 2001 to 2005, the OCIJ received
129 complaints against Js. 86 The OCIJ had taken 134 actions in
response to 121 complaints as of September 30, 2005:87
[A]bout 25 percent (34 [complaints]) were found to have no merit;
about 25 percent resulted in disciplinary actions against the judges
that included counseling (18), written reprimand (9), oral
reprimand (3), and suspension (4); about 22 percent (29) were
referred to DOJ's Office of Professional Responsibility or Office of
the Inspector General or EOIR's office of General Counsel for
further review; and the remaining 28 percent (37) resulted in
various other actions such as informing complainants of the Office
of Professional Responsibility process or their appeal rights to
BIA.88
In light of recent publicity highlighting the prevalence of
unethical conduct on the part of IJs, 89 the fact that only 129
complaints were filed over a four-year period is somewhat startling.
In reality, however, EOIR's administrative complaint procedure
suffers from several weaknesses. 9° These limitations may explain
the low number of reported complaints. Also, recent reforms to the
judicial review process for immigration cases may have encouraged
litigants to file appeals of their cases in circuit courts, 91 rather than
filing disciplinary complaints that have no effect on the substantive
outcome of a litigant's case. Individuals suffering from biased,
incompetent, or otherwise unethical behavior on the part of
immigration judges should have a more effective means of recourse
than appealing to the circuit courts or relying on the inadequate IJ
85. Id. An exception exists for complaints concerning allegations relating to
the "exercise of the authority of an attorney to investigate, litigate, or provide legal
advice." Id. Such complaints are referred directly to the Office of Professional
Responsibility, which is responsible for handling such allegations. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. The remaining eight complaints were still under review. Id.
88. GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 28-29.
89. See infra Part III.D-E.
90. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
91. See generally sources cited supra note 18.
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disciplinary process.
III. THE EXISTENCE OF AN ETHICAL CRISIS
A. Judicial Ethics Generally
The American judicial system is premised upon the ability of
judges to be ethical and fair. Judges are held to the highest standards
of professional behavior because of the powerful positions they
hold.92 The American Bar Association published a revised "Model
Code of Judicial Conduct" in February 2007.93 This Code applies to
"anyone who is authorized to perform judicial functions;" the newly
revised code specifically includes justices of the peace, magistrates,
court commissioners, and members of the administrative judiciary
within that definition. 94
As part of their ethical duties, all judges must make
competent decisions in an impartial manner, free from personal bias
or prejudice. 95  Even so, judges work with varying degrees of
competence and are generally somewhat involved in the affairs of
society at large.
A judge's involvement in the "outside world" is not
necessarily a negative characteristic, for such involvement can
"enrich[] the judicial temperament and enhance[] a judge's ability to
make difficult decisions." 96 In reality, the balance between the ideal
of judicial impartiality and the reality of personal preferences can be
difficult to strike. This problem of personal bias or prejudice
becomes even more nuanced when it is held against groups of
people; unlike business or financial interests, personal bias is
92. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.01 (3d
ed. 2000).
93. AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007)
[hereinafter ABA JUDICIAL CODE], available at http://
www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ABAMCJCapproved.pdf.
94. Id., para. I(B) of "Application" section, at 6. The National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges endorsed a "Model Code of Judicial Conduct" for
Federal Administrative Law Judges in February 1989.
95. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 4.01.
96. Id.
subjective and difficult to identify.97
According to the ABA, the term "bias" is commonly
understood to indicate favoritism or opposition by a judge to a
concept or idea, while the term "prejudice" suggests "specially
favoring or opposing individuals." 98  The ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct specifically prohibits actions manifesting either bias
or prejudice in the performance of judicial duties. 99
The determination of a judge's competence can be easier to
identify than bias. The ABA declared in the 2007 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct that judicial competence "requires the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary
to perform a judge's responsibilities of judicial office."' 00 One state
supreme court established the test for incompetence as "whether the
conduct at issue establishes that the [judge] lacks the requisite ability,
knowledge, judgment, or diligence to consistently and capably
discharge the duties of the office he or she holds."' 0 ' Regardless of
jurisdiction, judges are expected to bring a basic level of neutrality,
knowledge, skill, and dedication to the cases brought before them.
Accordingly, federal rules, case law, and ethical codes of
conduct seek to ensure judicial competence, professionalism, and
impartiality.0 2 For example, most judges are required to disqualify
themselves if they hold personal antagonism against a party, or hold
97. See id. § 4.04.
98. AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORTER'S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2007, Rule 2.3, Explanation of Comments, cmt. [1],
at 16. This article will use the term "bias" and "prejudice" in accordance with the
ABA definitions.
99. ABA JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 93, Rule 2.3.
100. Id. Rule 2.5, cmt. [1].
101. In re Baber, 847 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see also In re
Hunter, 823 So. 2d 325, 336 (La. 2002) (adopting the definition of judicial
competence used in In re Baber).
102. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b) (2000) (requiring a federal judge to
disqualify himself in any case in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned); ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.11 (same). Of course, the
laws and rules governing judicial conduct also address issues of conflicts of
interest, ex parte communications, and financial disclosures, among other things.
Because a thorough examination of each of these issues as they relate to IJs is
beyond the scope of this Article, the focus here is on the issues of bias and
competence.
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"[a]nimosity or irrational bias, such as racial prejudice," against a
particular group. 0 3 Such beliefs would obviously affect the ability
of a judge to decide a case impartially based only on facts and law,
and would undermine the judicial system.
B. Ethical Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges
Immigration courts in the United States are distinct from
other courts, and the fact that immigration judges do not operate
under the judicial branch has serious ethical implications. As a
unique body of adjudicators, immigration judges must follow several
codes of conduct. Because they are employees of the executive
branch, IJs are subject to the Standards of Ethical Conduct for
Employees of the Executive Branch. 104 In addition, IJs and BIA
members must follow the Department of Justice Codes of
Conduct, 0 5 the EOIR Ethics Manual, 10 6 and management policies
of both EOIR and the DOJ. The DOJ also recently proposed "Codes
of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board Members," which
are not yet in final form.' 0 7 As an attorney, an IJ is also subject to
the rules of professional conduct in the state(s) where the IJ is a
103. SHAMEN ET AL., supra note 92, § 4.04.
104. These standards are codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 2635 (2007) and 5 C.F.R. pt.
3801 (2007).
105. The Regulations provide:
Employees of the Department of Justice are subject to the executive
branch-wide Standards of Ethical Conduct at 5 C.F.R. part 2635, the
Department of Justice regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 3801 which
supplement the executive branch-wide standards, the executive branch-
wide financial disclosure regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 2634 and the
executive branch-wide employee responsibilities and conduct
regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 735.
28 C.F.R. § 45.1 (2007).
106. The Ethics Manual, distributed in 2001, is designed for members of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, Immigration Judges, and Administrative Law
Judges Employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review. See Executive
Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Ethics Manual [hereinafter
EOIR Ethics Manual], available at http:/ www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub.htm (last
visited Feb. 20, 2008).
107. The proposed text of the IJ Codes is published in the Federal Register.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Codes of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board
Members, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,510-13 (June 28, 2007).
member of the bar and in the state where she performs her duties. 108
Notably, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which is
used as a model for most state judicial codes of conduct, is not
binding on IJs and members of the BIA; rather, the ABA Model
Code is intended to be "aspirational" for IJs and BIA members.' 09 In
addition, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is not binding
on Js or BIA members because they are not members of the judicial
branch. "10
C. The Special Need for Ethical Behavior in Immigration Court
Given so many applicable rules of conduct, the existence of
an ethical crisis in immigration courts may seem surprising. After all,
with six to seven sets of rules potentially serving as guidance, how
could an immigration judge fail to act in an ethical manner?
In reality, the number of applicable codes is itself indicative
108. Id. These various codes of conduct have many parallels, including
prohibitions against bias and prejudice, conflicts of interest, impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety, and restrictions on extra-judicial activities such as
political activities. The codes also require a minimum level of competence on the
part of judges. Cf THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, available at http://
www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-extend.jsp?cid= 10158 (last visited Feb. 20,
2008); ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES (2002) [hereinafter CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES], available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
109. EOIR Ethics Manual, supra note 106, at 1 n.1 ("[T]he Model Code of
Judicial Conduct is not binding on EOIR Judges, but its canons and commentary
present aspirational goals."). The ABA, which published an updated version of the
Model Code for Judicial Conduct in April 2007, intended the Model Code to apply
to members of the "administrative law judiciary." ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note
93, Part I(B). Moreover, IJs are not subject to state judicial ethics codes governing
state judges. While extension of state judicial ethics codes on federal IJs is arguably
valid under the McDade Amendment, it would add more standards of conduct to
the already considerable number of codes applicable to them. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B
(2008). As an alternative, EOIR should focus on consolidating the ethical
guidelines of IJs into one comprehensive standard of conduct. See infra Part V.B.
110. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges applies to United States
circuit judges, district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal
Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES,
supra note 108, ch. I. The Tax Court, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have also adopted this Code. Id.
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of a problem: Immigration judges do not have the time or resources
to review multiple codes of conduct on a regular basis. Moreover,
actual training in ethics-related issues is substantially lacking for
immigration judges. One former IJ reported that EOIR's training
conferences for immigration judges would occasionally include an
hour or so related to ethics, but there was "certainly no local training
of judges on ethics issues."''1  In fact, training conferences for
immigration judges were completely suspended for several years due
to budgetary constraints.1 12 During those years, immigration judges
did not receive any formal ethical training at all. The DOJ again
suspended training conferences for immigration judges in February
2008 due to "budget constraints."" 3
In addition, the heavy workload of immigration judges leaves
no time for discussions regarding ethical conduct. When asked
whether immigration judges spoke with each other about ethical
codes of conduct, a former IJ replied, "Nobody even talked about it.
The judges I served with didn't know about [ethical codes of
conduct]. Their whole focus was on their calendar, wondering 'how
am I going to get through these five merits hearings I squeezed in
today?"' 114 With the pressures of a busy calendar, guidelines relating
to ethical conduct are considered a low priority.
Immigration judges undeniably face a great number of
challenges in their daily work. With limited resources, they are
expected to make determinations which are often life-or-death
111. Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.
112. Denise Slavin, President of the National Association of Immigration
Judges, commented in 2006, "We [IJs] are so low on funds. We haven't had a break
off the bench for three years We have had no training conferences, no cultural
sensitivity training." Adams, supra note 65. For recommendations regarding formal
ethics training for IJs, see infra Part V.B.
113. Letter from Dana Leigh Marks, President, & Denise Noonan Slavin, Vice
President, National Association of Immigration Judges to Chief Judge David L.
Neal, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter NAIJ
Letter] (on file with author). Immigration judges protested the cancellation of
training for Us, noting that the decision "will impact adversely on the quality of our
work" because "[c]ontinuous training is essential to maintain any kind of expertise,
which we are expected to have, in this area of the law." Id.
114. Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.
decisions for the litigants before them. 115 Many cases coming before
immigration judges involve complex legal or factual issues, but, in
2006, only 35% of litigants were represented by counsel." 6 Relevant
evidence is often unavailable, including witnesses or documents that
could prove persecution in a home country." 7 Also, only 11.6% of
immigration court proceedings in the 2006 fiscal year were
conducted in English." 8  As a result, it can be difficult for
immigration judges to identify relevant issues or make "credibility
determinations" to decide whether a litigant is telling the truth. The
latter point is arguably the most important: since immigration judges
are responsible for the crucial determinations of a litigant's credibility
that often decide the case, a litigant's courtroom demeanor can have a
substantial impact on the success of his claim. 119
Ashcroft's streamlining reforms, minimizing judicial review
of an immigration judge's opinions, place an even greater emphasis
on a foreign national's initial proceeding before the IJ. Unless a
litigant is financially and practically able to appeal a removal order to
the circuit courts, a foreign national's ability to stay in the United
115. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office recognized, IJs must
balance "adjudicating their caseload (all cases awaiting adjudication) in a timely
manner while at the same time ensuring that the rights of the immigrants appearing
before them are protected." GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 2.
116. See 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at Al.
117. Alexander, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that the "ability to gather evidence
may be blocked by the very government alleged to be the persecutor").
118. 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at Fl. In fiscal year 2006, 252 different
languages were spoken in immigration court proceedings, a nineteen percent
increase in language diversity since fiscal year 2002. Id.; see also Walker
Statement, supra note 73 (discussing the "unique nature of immigration hearings,"
wherein "[a]liens frequently do not speak English, so the Immigration Judge must
work with a translator, and the Immigration Judge normally must go over particular
testimony several times before he can be confident that he is getting an accurate
answer from the alien").
119. This is an especially important issue in light of the passage of the REAL
ID Act of 2005, which added a provision to the asylum statute instructing IJs to
"evaluate demeanor and consistency of statements to determine credibility."
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005. Div. B (REAL ID Act of 2005), Pub. L. No.
109-13, § 101(a), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(B)(iii)
(Supp. 2005)); see Katherine E. Melloy, Note, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID
Act's Credibility Provisions Affect Women Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REv. 637,
640 (2007).
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States essentially lies in the hands of the immigration judge.
For this reason, fair and competent adjudication in
immigration court proceedings is critical. Indeed, "trivial mistakes [in
immigration court] can unwittingly lead to flawed decisions with
grave consequences." 120 Individuals seeking relief before an
immigration judge must therefore be guaranteed certain procedural
rights, including the opportunity to present evidence on their behalf
in removal proceedings.12 1  Additionally, a person seeking
withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against
Torture is entitled to a fair hearing under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 122 In order to ensure the
fairness of a removal proceeding, the arbiter must be neutral,
meaning "one who has not pre-decided the case and who is not
predisposed to disregard a witness's testimony ."123
In addition to neutrality, immigration judges must maintain a
basic level of competence in immigration law. This is especially true
in light of the unique and difficult nature of immigration cases.
Denise Slavin, former President of the National Association of
Immigration Judges, noted, "Immigration law is very complex. So
generally speaking, it's very good to have someone coming into this
area with [an] immigration background. It's very difficult, for those
who don't, to catch up.' 124 Also, immigration law changes often, and
IJs must be able to apply the most current laws to each case.
Unfortunately, in recent years the ability of immigration
judges to render competent decisions, and to set aside their personal
120. Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[I]t is not
surprising that the position of overburdened immigration judges and overworked
courts has become a matter of wide concern.").
121.8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006).
122. Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Al Khouri
v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004) ("The Fifth Amendment's due
process clause mandates that removal proceedings be fundamentally fair.").
123. Tun, 485 F.3d at 1025; see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
242 (1980) ("The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases."); Lopez-Umanzor v.
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (Due Process violation existed
because IJ refused to hear relevant testimony because of a prejudgment about the
credibility of the witness).
124. Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44, at Al.
biases or prejudices against litigants, has come into question. 125
Indeed, the very fact that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
proposed a new set of codes of conduct indicates the government's
acknowledgment that a crisis exists in immigration court. 126
D. Statistical Inconsistencies
Considering the importance of the IJ's decision-making
process, it is especially alarming to note that scholars conducting
recent statistical analyses have revealed evidence of inconsistent
decisions made by immigration judges. 12  Despite the fact that
EOIR's mission statement guarantees "uniform application of the
nation's immigration laws in all cases," studies assessing the grant
and deny rates of immigration judges in the same type of case show
that "immigration courts are failing to meet this fundamental
standard." 
28
125. See sources cited supra note 11.
126. See infra Part W.B. Alberto Gonzales resigned from office in August
2007, and his last day in office was September 17, 2007. Remarks of Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales Announcing His Resignation, Aug. 27, 2007,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2007/ag-speech-
070827.html. Gonzales's reform directives have not changed since his resignation.
See Kent B. Alexander, The Future of the Justice Department, WASH. POST, Aug.
28, 2007 (noting that the Department of Justice will continue its work even if there
are changes among political appointees). On September 17, 2007, President George
W. Bush nominated Judge Michael Mukasey to replace Attorney General
Gonzales. Michael Abramowitz & Dan Eggen, With Justice Pick, Bush Hopes to
Avoid a Fight, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2007. The United States Senate confirmed
Judge Mukasey as Attorney General on November 8, 2007. Laurie Kellman,
Mukasey Confirmed as Attorney General, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 2007.
127. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 372. This 2007 study parallels
results discovered in a 2000 study published by the San Jose Mercury News. See
Fredric N. Tulsky, Asylum Seekers Face Capricious Legal System; Some Judges
Grant Asylum in Only 1 in 20 Cases, Others in 1 in Every 2; Former Government
Immigration Lawyers Are Toughest Asylum Judges; Rulings Vary Widely, Even for
Applicants with Similar Stories, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000, at Al.
For data results, see TRAC, Judges Show Disparity in Denying Asylum, July 31,
2006, available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160 (last visited July 22,
2007). For an excellent analysis of this data and its implications, see Alexander,
supra note 8, at 21-25.
128. Alexander, supra note 8, at 21 (citing DOJ Mission Statement, supra note
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A recent study on this issue by Professors Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag, published in the
Stanford Law Review ("Ramji-Nogales study"), identified disturbing
inconsistencies in the adjudication of immigration law claims. 129
Their analysis of immigration courts throughout the country revealed
''remarkable variation in decision-making" among different
immigration officials, regions, judicial circuits, and years.' 30 For
example, a Chinese asylum seeker in the Atlanta Immigration Court
had a seven percent chance of winning asylum, compared to a
seventy-six percent chance of winning asylum for a Chinese
applicant in the Orlando Immigration Court. 131  The study also
examined grant rate disparities between judges from the same
immigration court. 132 Incredibly, the study found that three out of
four immigration courts housed judges with large grant rate
disparities from other judges, meaning they were "out of step with
the other judges in their courthouse."' 33 Indeed, asylum applicants
who appeared before the highest granting judge were nearly thirty
times more likely to win their claims than applicants appearing
before the lowest granting judge. 134 These statistics are critically
important, for they indicate that immigration law is not being applied
in a uniform manner. As the study's authors point out, the outcome of
a refugee's asylum claim depends most on the identity of the judge
assigned to hear his case.135
Disparities in the grant rates of immigration judges were
successfully correlated to differences in biographical information of
the judges. 136 For example, the study found that female immigration
judges granted asylum in 53.8% of asylum cases, while male judges
granted relief in only 37.3% of asylum cases. 137  In addition,
immigration judges with prior work experience on the prosecutorial
129. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 296.
130. Id. at 302.
131. Id. at 330-31.
132. Id. at 333.
133. Id. at 333-34.
134. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 330-32.
135. Id. at 296.
136. Id. at 296.
137. Id. at 342.
side of immigration proceedings were 24% less likely to grant
asylum than those with no prior government experience. 138 Notably,
all judges with immigration law backgrounds appointed by the Bush
administration since 2001 had prosecutorial experience.
139
These statistics cannot be relied upon to show unethical
behavior per se on the part of individual judges. However, scholars
have suggested the mere fact that such inconsistencies existed within
a court is some "evidence that the process is inaccurate and
unfair."' 14° Indeed, the Ramji-Nogales study's authors concluded that
the great deviation in grant rates for some immigration judges
suggests that an adjudicator could be "imposing his or her own
philosophical attitude (or personal level of skepticism about
applicants' testimony) to the cases under consideration."' 14 ' The
study's authors believed their data raised "serious questions about
whether the results of cases are excessively influenced by personal
characteristics of the judges."' 142  Similarly, Mr. Alexander cited
statistics showing disparities among immigration judges' decisions as
"evidence of unfairness and inaccuracy" and an "indicator of the
immigration court crisis."' 14
3
While all judges bring their personal experience to the bench,
ethical standards exist to ensure that judges do not rely too heavily on
their own preferences when making decisions. Evidence of
disparities in decision-making signifies that judges' personal
preferences may unduly influence their decisions in court, since
"inconsistency among judges suggests that bias and prejudice are
138. Id. at 345-46.
139. Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44, at Al.
140. Alexander, supra note 8, at 29; see also Jason D. Vendel, Note, General
Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is There a Remedy for Social Security
Disability Claimants?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 769, 773 (2005) ("[A] practical
method of proof [to show judicial bias] is by examining multiple decisions-either
statistically or in some other systematic manner.").
141. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 378.
142. Id. at 304. Similar concerns existed regarding grant rates for asylum
officers: "officers who adjudicate asylum applications in some of the eight regional
offices of the Department of Homeland Security's asylum office appear to have
grant rates that reflect personal outlooks rather than an office consensus." Id. at
375.
143. Alexander, supra note 8, at 21.
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influencing the outcomes." 144 For example, as the Ramji-Nogales
study noted, "immigration lawyers have sometimes complained that
after an immigrant judge is lied to several times by nationals of a
particular country, the judge tends to suspect that all nationals of that
country are liars."' 145  The notion that judges are basing their
determinations on personal preferences rather than on the law
epitomizes bias on the bench. Thus, in addition to calling for
structural reform to respond to the crisis in immigration courts, the
Ramji-Nogales study highlights the need for uniform ethical
standards and strict enforcement of such standards for immigration
judges.
Unfortunately, with diminished monitoring of individual
judges and courtrooms, it is more difficult to identify potentially
problematic behavior. 4 6  In reality, the burden of reprimanding
immigration judges has fallen to the only persons thoroughly
reviewing their conduct: federal appellate judges.
E. Circuit Court Frustration
The frustration of circuit court judges, who are faced with the
onerous task of reviewing opinions from immigration judges that are
usually summarily affirmed by the BIA, is rising. Since the 2003
reforms eliminating internal review procedures for immigration cases
went into effect, appeals to the circuit courts have increased
exponentially. For example, while the Ninth Circuit received 11,238
petitions for review in the thirty years between April 1, 1972 and
April 1, 2002, it received an incredible 18,263 petitions for review in
just three years between April 1, 2002 and October 1, 2005.147
The sheer number of petitions is not the only problem
plaguing circuit courts. In an influential 2005 opinion voicing the
concerns of appellate judges, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
144. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 25.
145. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 381-82.
146. EOIR does have procedures for complaints against IJs, but those
procedures are inadequate. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.a.
147. Palmer, supra note 18, at 14 n.3. Similarly, the Second Circuit received
only 2360 petitions for review between April 1, 1972 and April 1, 2002, but
received 7723 petitions for review between April 1, 2002, and October 1, 2005. Id.
at 14 n.2.
cited an extensive pattern of judicial bias and inappropriate behavior
on the part of immigration judges. 4 8 Circuit judges following Judge
Posner's lead are increasingly reprimanding immigration judges for
problematic behavior. 149 In 2007, the Second Circuit took the highly
unusual step of singling out an individual immigration judge for
egregious behavior on the bench, and recommending the Justice
148. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005). Judge
Posner's list of circuit cases rebuking the conduct of IJs and the BIA includes
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The IJ's opinion is
riddled with inappropriate and extraneous comments ."); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424
F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This very significant mistake suggests that the
Board was not aware of the most basic facts of [the petitioner's] case .");
Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The procedure that
the IJ employed in this case is an affront to [petitioner's] right to be heard.");
Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding
the IJ's factual conclusion to be "totally unsupported by the record"); Grupee v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding the IJs unexplained
conclusion to be "hard to take seriously"). Noting that "[o]ther circuits have been
as critical," Judge Posner cited cases from different circuits, including Wang v.
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The tone, the tenor,
the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to a court
television show than a federal court proceeding."); Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the IJ's finding to be "grounded solely on
speculation and conjecture"); Fiadjoe v. Attomey Gen. of the U.S., 411 F.3d 135,
154-55 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the IJ's "hostile" and "extraordinarily abusive"
conduct toward petitioner "by itself would require a rejection of his credibility
finding"); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[I]t is the I's
conclusion, not [the petitioner's] testimony, that 'strains credulity."'). Id.
149. See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that
the I's "intemperate" manner and sarcasm with petitioner "raised substantial
questions as to his bias and hostility toward" the asylum applicant); N'Diom v.
Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., concurring) (noting the
"significantly increasing rate at which adjudication lacking in reason, logic, and
effort from immigration courts is reaching the federal circuits"); Sholla v.
Gonzales, 492 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2007) (IJ denied asylum even though "the
record compels any reasonable factfinder to conclude that [the applicant] suffered
past persecution on a protected ground"); Mece v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 562, 572
(6th Cir. 2005) ("The Board's failure to find clear error in the immigration judge's
adverse credibility determination leaves us, we are frank to say, more than a little
puzzled."); lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The immigration
judge's opinion cannot be regarded as reasoned ."); Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales,
400 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2005); Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1166-68
(9th Cir. 2000). See generally Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Department review each of this judge's decisions. '50 The judge was
later removed from the bench. 15'
Immigration lawyers practicing in immigration court believe
that biased and incompetent behavior is widespread on the
immigration bench. 152 Anecdotal evidence of this type of unethical
conduct is plentiful in immigration cases recently reviewed by the
circuit courts. Two 2007 cases particularly highlight the problems of
bias and incompetence in immigration court.
1. The Biased Immigration Judge: Tun v. Gonzales
To understand the impact of bias on the bench, we return to
the story of Naing Tun, a Burmese citizen seeking asylum in the
United States. In May 2007, in response to Tun's appeal of the IJ's
and BIA's denials of his asylum claim, the Eighth Circuit addressed
the issue of bias in immigration courtrooms.1 53 As a member of a
minority group in Burma, Tun filed an application for asylum
claiming torture, past persecution, and a fear of future persecution.
Tun alleged he had been arrested, interrogated, and beaten due to his
political activities. 154 He further claimed he had been incarcerated
for three years and forced to do hard labor. 155
To prove his claims, Tun submitted two expert opinions. The
first was a report by a recognized expert on conditions in Burma.
Despite the expert's strong qualifications in the field and his report
speaking to a "critical, contested issue in the case,' '156 the IJ
concluded that the expert's document would "not be given any
weight" because the government was unable to cross-examine
him. 157 The second expert opinion, also excluded by the immigration
150. Ray Rivera, Court Urges Review of New York Judge's Immigration Cases
That Are on Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at 1.
151. Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judge Is Reassigned to a Desk Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at BI.
152. Interviews with anonymous immigration law practitioners, S.F., Calif.,
July and August 2007 (notes on file with author).
153. Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2007).
154. Id. at 1018.
155. Id.
156.Id. at 1017-18.
157. Id. at 1019.
judge, was a medical report submitted as evidence of the residual
trauma Tun endured due to torture at the hands of Burmese
authorities.' 58 Notwithstanding the physician's extensive experience
treating victims of trauma and volunteer medical work in numerous
war-tom countries, the IJ concluded the physician was not a qualified
expert, in part because she had not personally been to Burma. 159
These actions on the part of the IJ demonstrate an
unwillingness to consider properly proffered evidence submitted by
an asylum applicant. 160 However, the bias of this immigration judge
against Tun became even more apparent as his hearing continued.
The IJ and the attorneys involved in the case questioned Tun through
a Burmese interpreter. 6' Tun provided detailed testimony of his
arrest, beatings, and other forms of mistreatment caused by the
Burmese government for his political activities. However, there were
"at least a dozen instances" where Tun indicated that he did not
understand the translator, and "at least a dozen other instances"
where Tun's responses, as provided to the court by the translator,
were "confusing or not directly responsive to the questions originally
asked in English."'162  A native Burmese speaker present in the
courtroom interrupted the proceedings to inform the immigration
judge that "the official translator was not correctly translating the
questions and answers."' 63 After the hearing, the IJ declined Tun's
request to reopen the record or hold a new hearing based on
translation errors. 164  Relying on Tun's allegedly "inconsistent"
testimony, the IJ concluded that Tun lacked credibility. 165 Based on
her adverse credibility determinations, the immigration judge denied
Tun's request for asylum.
158. Id. at 1019-20.
159. Tun, 485 F.3d at 1020.
160. Immigration judges are required to advise a litigant that "he or she will
have a reasonable opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him or
her," and "to present evidence in his or her own behalf." 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4)
(2007).
161. Tun, 485 F.3d at 1020.
162. Id. at 1022. The Eighth Circuit quoted the improper translation in detail in
the opinion. Id. at 1022 n.2.
163. Id. at 1017.
164. Id. at 1024.
165. Id. at 1030-31.
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The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed Tun's
appeal, holding that the record provided examples to support the IJ's
finding of inconsistencies.166 Upon review, the Eight Circuit
disagreed with the IJ's and BIA's conclusions. In doing so, the court
considered the IJ's exclusions of the expert's reports and evaluated
the alleged inconsistencies in Tun's testimony.
Regarding the testimony of the Burmese expert, the court
held the expert was undoubtedly qualified to report on country
conditions in Burma. Moreover, the court noted that the presence of
an author of a report and his availability for cross-examination are
not "absolute requirements" for submission of the report in
immigration proceedings. 167 The court found the IJ's decision to
"exclude the report of a facially unobjectionable expert without any
explanation as to why cross-examination was needed" was "unfair
and unsupportable."' 68
The court similarly found that the second expert, a physician,
was clearly qualified to offer "critical corroborating testimony."'' 69
As such, the court determined that the exclusion of Dr. Frye's report
affected the outcome of the proceedings, since the IJ "completely
ignored the most valuable corroborating evidence of [Tun's]
torture."' 170 The court noted that the J's desire to conclude the
hearing in time to allow the court translator to "make a six O'clock
flight" later that day seemed to have substantial weight in the IJ's
decision to exclude Dr. Frye's testimony. 17 1  Significant from an
ethical perspective, the court recognized that the IJ's actions
suggested she "may not have acted as a neutral arbiter."' 172
Lastly, the court was "troubled by the lack of consideration
given by the IJ and the Board" to the issue of translation error,
especially since all "indicia of erroneous translation were present" in
Tun's case. 7' The errors performed by the J went beyond simply
166. Id. at 1025.
167. Id. at 1028.
168. Id. at 1028-29.
169. Id. at 1027.
170. Id. at 1028.
171. Id. at 1026.
172. Id. at 1027.
173. Id. at 1029-30.
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ignoring evidence of erroneous translation. The IJ also improperly
relied on the resulting erroneous portions of the transcript to find that
Tun lacked credibility, and focused on "minutia in the effort to find
inconsistencies" in Tun's testimony. 174  Together, the court found
these errors added to the "overall prejudice" against Tun. 175
Accordingly, the court remanded the case with specific instructions
to the IJ to ensure adequate translation and to consider specific
evidence submitted by Tun. 176
Tun v. Gonzales represents the substantive effects of a biased
judge in immigration proceedings. As the court noted, the
immigration judge's combined errors were "sufficiently pervasive
that we must conclude they may have had an effect on the outcome"
of the case.177 Unlike other IJs reprimanded by circuit courts, the
immigration judge in Tun did not vocalize her bias by yelling or
speaking in an improper manner.' 78 Rather, the IJ's bias against Tun
took a more subtle form, exemplified by her refusal to consider the
adequacy of the translation services provided to Tun during his
hearing.
The IJ was certainly alerted to the translation problem. But
even with knowledge of potentially erroneous translation occurring in
her courtroom, the IJ took no action to ensure the reliability of Tun's
translated testimony. Without the presence of a native Burmese
speaker in the courtroom, Tun may never have known his words were
not being properly conveyed to the judge. Although Tun successfully
convinced the Eighth Circuit that the translation problem affected the
outcome of his case, a more disturbing question remains: why would
an IJ fail to ensure an applicant's testimony is being properly
translated?
Surely immigration judges are aware that federal law
174. Id. at 1030. The court noted that "we can have no confidence that the
answers relayed by the interpreter to the IJ and the attorneys accurately reflected
what [Tun] answered." Id.
175. Tun, 485 F.3d at 1030.
176. Id. at 1031.
177. Id.
178. Immigration judges have been reprimanded for yelling at litigants, using
sarcastic language, and otherwise displaying blatantly inappropriate behavior on
the bench. See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007); Wang v.
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005).
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requires proper translation in immigration hearings.' 79  Thus, the
problem was not the result of the IJ's lack of knowledge. Rather, the
IJ's refusal to ensure adequate translation services to Tun suggests the
presence of bias against an asylum applicant. Essentially, the IJ's
actions indicated to Tun that his own words were irrelevant; if she
was not going to consider his testimony anyway, why bother to
translate his words accurately? In this way, the IJ's bias impacted her
decision-making process and had a significant negative effect on
Tun's case. Despite the difficulties inherent in identifying this type of
unethical conduct, this case represents the importance of eliminating
bias from the immigration bench.
2. The Incompetent Immigration Judge: Tadesse v. Gonzales
In addition to biased conduct, judicial incompetence in
immigration courts is raising increased concerns in the circuit courts.
In July 2007, the Seventh Circuit reprimanded the incompetent
conduct of an immigration judge in Tadesse v. Gonzales.180  Ejigu
Tadesse was an Ethiopian citizen of half Eritrean descent."'8 After a
cease-fire was declared ending the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea,
Tadesse tried to travel to Ethiopia to learn what had happened to her
immediate family.' 8 2 She was detained at the airport by Ethiopian
policemen, who accused her of being an Eritrean spy due to her
ethnic heritage. Tadesse claimed the policemen severely beat her and
that two of the officers raped her. They then ordered her to leave the
country.183 Tadesse sought medical treatment and stayed with a
family friend for two months before leaving Ethiopia. She eventually
arrived in the United States and sought asylum.
The immigration judge denied Tadesse's application for
asylum, holding that she included fraudulent documents in her
179 Federal law requires that interpreters in a hearing before an IJ be "sworn
to interpret and translate accurately." 8 C.F.R. § 1240.5 (2007). However,
interpreters in immigration courtrooms are "of mixed ability." Ramji-Nogales et
al., supra note 11, at 383.
180. 492 F.3d 905, 912 (7th Cir. 2007).
181. Id. at 906.
182. Id.
183. Id.
application for asylum and finding Tadesse's testimony "implausible
and inconsistent."'' 8 4 The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision and Tadesse
sought relief in the circuit courts.
The IJ first concluded that Tadesse submitted fraudulent
documents as part of her asylum application. During the merits
hearing, the government submitted a report concluding that Tadesse's
Ethiopian deportation order was fraudulent.' 85 Tadesse objected on
the grounds that she had not been given an opportunity to study the
report in advance of the hearing.' 86 The IJ did not give Tadesse an
opportunity to review the report, but promised to allow Tadesse to
present her own expert in rebuttal. 187
At the next hearing, Tadesse offered an affidavit and expert
testimony of an "eminent scholar" of Ethiopian politics and culture
who had written extensively about Ethiopia.' 88 However, the IJ
refused to accept the expert's affidavit or testimony because he was
not "an expert as to the issuance of documents."' 189 In the first of a
series of rebukes to the immigration judge, the appellate court held
the IJ's rejection of this evidence was "arbitrary" and "prejudicial,"
because the expert testimony was "directly on point [to the
authenticity of the deportation order] and went to the very heart of
Tadesse's claim." 190
The IJ also discounted the evidence offered by Tadesse in the
affidavit of her torture counselor, reasoning that "although [the
counselor] is a 'therapist' she is not a psychologist or psychiatrist." 191
However, the counselor's affidavit noted that she held a master's
degree in psychology and expected to receive her Ph.D. in clinical
psychology nine months prior to the IJ's date of decision. Thus, the
"IJ's comment was therefore incorrect as well as inappropriate."' 192
Regarding Tadesse's post-torture symptoms, the IJ's opinion came to
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 907. Ms. Tadesse was represented before the IJ by attorney Nancy
Vizer, who provided additional insight into this case.
187. Tadesse, 492 F.3d at 907.
188. Id. at 908.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 909.
191.Id. at 911.
192. Id.
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a conclusion that was "completely at odds with [the counselor's]
affidavit." '193 Such discrepancies led the Seventh Circuit to conclude
that the IJ had not properly reviewed the evidence, for the "IJ could
not have carefully reviewed [the counselor's] findings and reached
this conclusion." '194 The appellate court's frustration with the IJ's
inadequate judicial performance was quite evident: the court
complained that "[t]his portion of the opinion, like so much else, is
not supported by cogent reasons and cannot stand." 195
Although the IJ further concluded that portions of Tadesse's
testimony related to her return to Ethiopia and her choice to seek
asylum were "implausible," the court reprimanded the IJ for such
conclusions, which were "unsupported by substantial evidence."', 96
The court ultimately determined the IJ's opinion was "riddled with
systematic and obvious errors." 197 As a result of the IJ's erroneous
opinion, the court found that Tadesse did not receive a fair hearing in
immigration court and therefore granted Tadesse's petition for review
and remanded her case.' 98
The IJ hearing Tadesse's claim acted incompetently in
several ways. First, her failure to allow Tadesse to offer expert
evidence in rebuttal was legally improper, since "an J may not bar
whole chunks of material evidence favorable to [Tadesse]."' 99 At a
minimum judicial competence requires "legal knowledge., 20 0  By
failing to properly follow the law permitting an applicant to present
evidence on her own behalf, the IJ displayed a lack of "legal
knowledge" necessary to properly decide this case.
Second, the IJ's obvious failure to carefully review an
affidavit submitted by Tadesse is disturbing. Although judicial
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 910.
197. Id. at 912.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 909; see also Boyanivskyy v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 286, 294 (7th Cir.
2006) (finding U' exclusion of asylum applicant's corroboration witnesses to be
prejudicial error); Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005)
(same).
200. ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.5, cmt. [1].
competence requires "thoroughness" and "preparation,"' ' the IJ
deciding Tadesse's case did not adjudicate the case in a thorough
manner. Moreover, if immigration judges are not reviewing evidence
put forth by applicants, the competency and integrity of the entire
hearing is undermined.
Not surprisingly, given that the IJ did not properly consider
Tadesse's written evidence, the IJ also inexplicably refused to believe
portions of Tadesse's testimony. Certainly it is within the discretion
of an immigration judge to determine whether an applicant is lying,
but the circuit court found that this IJ's credibility determinations
were unsupported by substantial evidence-that is, she had no logical
reason to believe Tadesse was lying.
These issues point to a larger and inescapable ethical
conclusion: the immigration judge was either legally incompetent, or
was actively biased against Tadesse. Either of these possibilities is
contrary to the American concept of justice. Even in the face of
limited resources and time constraints, a "neutral" arbiter should
follow the rules of evidence and should be reasonably prepared for a
hearing. Without the assurance of unbiased and competent behavior
on the bench, the immigration system cannot reasonably promise
litigants they will receive a fair hearing. In this way, active bias or
legal incompetence on the part of immigration judges skews the
system itself; if an immigrant's claim is ultimately decided through an
unfair proceeding, the reliability of the entire adjudicatory process is
threatened. In light of these far-reaching consequences, evidence
showing judicial bias and incompetence raises the next question:
what are the causes of unethical conduct on the immigration bench?
IV. CAUSES AND PENDING SOLUTIONS
A. Causes of Unethical Conduct
Several potential causes of unethical behavior on the part of
immigration judges emerge through analysis of recent cases. One
reason, discussed in Part III.C, supra, is the difficult and unique
nature of immigration cases. Another contributing factor-analyzed
often by scholars and practitioners-is the lack of time and resources
201. Id.
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available to immigration judges.20 2
Immigration judges are certainly overworked; in 2006, the
nation's 215 immigration judges completed a total of 365,851
cases. 20 3 Each judge must therefore adjudicate 1,700 cases a year, or
nearly seven cases each business day, to stay current with her
docket.2°4 Although Second Circuit Chief Judge Walker urged
Congress to double the existing number of immigration judges,
Congress has yet to do so. 20 5
Without the ability to take time to consider each case,
immigration judges are bound to make mistakes-often serious
mistakes with critical implications for the immigrants appearing
before them. 20 6 A judge without the time or resources to adequately
review changes in the law, or to properly consider fact-intensive
cases, may slip into a pattern of errors. In this way, an overworked
judge can quickly become an incompetent judge.20 7 For example,
Tadesse's IJ may have failed to adequately read Tadesse's affidavit
due to time constraints; Tadesse's case was likely only one of many
merits hearings heard by the IJ that day. Also, an immigration judge
feeling pressure to complete a large caseload may lose the ability to
recognize where personal bias enters the decision-making process.
However, even if the reasons for bias or incompetence on the
part of immigration judges can be understood in the context of
202. Alexander, supra note 8, at 19-20; Melloy, supra note 119, at 666-67;
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 383.
203. 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at B2; Alexander, supra note 8, at 19.
204. The former President of the National Association of Immigration Judges,
Denise Slavin, reported in 2005 that she had 1,000 cases on her docket at one time.
Liptak, supra note 8; see also Alexander, supra note 8, at 19-20. Immigration
judges in busy districts must manage disproportionately larger caseloads; "while
the average immigration judge hears four cases a day, immigration judges on the
Texas border hear at least ten." Melloy, supra note 119, at 666.
205. Walker Statement, supra note 73.
206. See Alexander, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that Js "simply do not have
enough time to do their jobs well").
207. Immigration judges are under extreme pressure to complete cases
expeditiously, to the point where some Assistant Chief Immigration Judges actually
visit Us in person to encourage them to move cases more quickly. Marks Interview,
supra note 66. In this type of environment, judges are "less inclined to sit and listen
to a case, or to give it the time it needs." Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.
difficult cases and understaffed courts, such behavior violates the
norms of judicial ethics. Judicial neutrality and competence must be
prioritized over expedient resolution of cases. As the Seventh Circuit
noted in 2004, litigants seeking to remain in the United States
"should not bear the entire burden of adjudicative inadequacy at the
administrative level. 2 °8  Fortunately, the government now
recognizes the importance of ensuring ethical conduct in immigration
courts.
B. The Response of Attorney General Gonzales: The EOIR Codes of
Conduct
The growing cry for reform-from immigration practitioners,
circuit court judges, and immigration judges themselves 20 9-finally
reached the ears of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. In January
2006, Gonzales announced that he received reports of conduct on the
part of immigration judges which "can aptly be described as
intemperate or even abusive." 210  Following a "comprehensive
review," Gonzales proposed a set of reforms in August 2006.211
These "key reforms" included performance evaluations for
immigration judges, an immigration law exam, sanctioning powers
allowing immigration judges to sanction litigants and counsel for
"false statements, frivolous behavior, and other gross misconduct, ,212
208. Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e have
never heard it argued that busy judges should be excused from having to deliver
reasoned judgments because they are too busy to think."); see also lao v. Gonzales,
400 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e are not authorized to affirm unreasoned
decisions even when we understand why they are unreasoned.").
209. See generally Liptak, supra note 8.
210. Memorandum from Attomey General Alberto Gonzales to Immigration
Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-
asy-ag-memo-ijs.pdf.
211. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration
Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], available at http://
www.usdoj .gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06-ag-520.html.
212. Allowing Js to sanction litigants could enable these judges to control
potentially unethical behavior on the part of immigration lawyers in their
courtrooms. However, given the persistence of unethical behavior on the part of IJs
themselves, this particular reform idea will not remedy the ethical crisis on the
bench.
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increased resources, and technological improvements. 21 3  On the
issue of judicial ethics, Gonzales promised to draft a new code of
conduct for immigration judges and BIA members, impose
"mechanisms to detect poor conduct and quality by immigration
judges and Board members," and improve complaint procedures for
inappropriate conduct by adjudicators. 214
Gonzales's reform measures were initially hailed as a large
step in the right direction. 215 However, it soon became apparent that
implementation of these reforms would not be an expedited or simple
task. More than a year after Attorney General promised reforms,
immigration judges had not seen any "changes on the ground."'2 16
It took nearly a year after the reforms were announced for
EOIR to release the promised "Codes of Conduct of the Immigration
Judges and Board Members" ("EOIR Codes").217 The EOIR Codes,
proposed in June 2007, are intended to supplement the personnel
disciplinary rules, ethics rules, and management policies of EOIR
and the DOJ, and are designed to "preserve the integrity and
professionalism of the immigration court system" and the BIA.218
EOIR has not announced when the Codes are expected to be
published in final form and the process of editing the Codes is
"internal" to the DOJ. 2 19
The proposed EOIR Codes are similar to those already in
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Melloy, supra note 119, at 667 n.228.
216. Pamela A. Maclean, Mixed Signals from the DOJ Immigration Bench
Reforms: Implemented, or Not?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 16, 2007, at 1; see also NAIJ
Letter, supra note 113. ("[As of February 2008], there has been no implementation
[of] what we consider to be the two key measures [in Attorney General Gonzales's
reform proposal] to improve the Immigration Court system. Indeed, we have lost
ground." (endnote omitted)).
217. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges and
Board Members, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,510 (proposed June 28, 2007) [hereinafter EOIR
CODES]. The Codes were released for public comment from June 28, 2007 to July
30, 2007; final publication is pending. There is a separate set of codes for IJs and
for members of the BIA, but their provisions are substantially similar and the
references herein generally apply to both.
218. Id. pmbl. (capitalization removed).
219. Telephone Interview with official from EOIR Office of Legislative and
Public Affairs (Aug. 18, 2007).
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place for other judges. For example, like the recently revised ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the EOIR Codes require IJs/BIA
members to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.
220
The Codes require an IJ/BIA member to comply with the codes of
professional responsibility where the IJ/BIA member is a member of
the bar, as well as the state in which the IJ/BIA member performs
his/her duties. 221 This rule could provide a significant basis for
disciplinary procedures against IJs or BIA members who fail to
comply with ethical guidelines as attorneys.
The EOIR Codes demonstrate a renewed emphasis on
professionalism for IJs and BIA members, perhaps acknowledging
the effects of inappropriate judicial conduct on the perceived
integrity of the immigration structure. As the Commentary to the
EOIR Codes recognizes, "an immigration judge who manifests bias
or engages in unprofessional conduct in any manner during a
proceeding may impair the fairness of the proceeding and may bring
into question the impartiality of the immigration court system.,
222
The EOIR Codes require immigration judges and BIA members to
"act in a professional manner toward the parties and their
representatives before the court, and toward others with whom the
immigration judge deals in an official capacity., 223 Like the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct, the EOIR Codes also require that IJs/BlA
members act "impartially" and avoid any actions that "in the
judgment of a reasonable person, would create the appearance that he
or she is violating the law or applicable ethical standards." 224 IJs and
BIA members must therefore "refrain from any conduct, including
but not limited to financial and business dealings, that tends to reflect
adversely on impartiality, demeans the judicial office, interferes with
the proper performance of judicial duties, or exploits the immigration
judge's official position., 225
Furthermore, the EOIR Codes address the issue of bias and
incompetence in the courtroom. Like other types of judges,
220. EOIR CODES, supra note 217, pmbl.; ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note
93, Rule 1.2.
221. EOIR CODES, supra note 217, Canon III.
222. Id. Commentary.
223. Id. Canon X.
224. Id. Canons VI, VII.
225. Id. Canon XI.
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immigration judges and BIA members must adhere to the law and
"maintain professional competence in it."' 226 In addition to this basic
requirement of competence, EOIR now requires that an immigration
judge "shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in his or
her official capacity., 227 Although this point should be a matter of
simple professional courtesy, the behavior of the IJs hearing Tun's
and Tadesse's cases sadly demonstrates the necessity for this rule.
On the issue of bias, both immigration judges and BIA
members are informed they "shall not, in the performance of official
duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice."'228 This
critical provision is clearly a response to concerns of biased and
prejudiced behavior by IJs and BIA members against litigants. The
burden lies on the judges themselves, who must be "alert to avoid
behavior, to include inappropriate demeanor, that may be perceived
as prejudicial. 229 While these statements should be heralded as long
overdue and promising developments for ethical standards, they also
highlight the limitations of such Codes of Conduct.
The EOIR Codes fail to adequately address the unique nature
of immigration court. The Codes do not acknowledge the language
challenges, credibility issues, and fact-intensive inquiries conducted
by immigration judges. One immigration judge, speaking off the
record, noted that the Codes do not provide any real guidance, since
they do not contain anything "different from what all of us [should]
try to do in the first place." 230
Specific shortcomings undermine the ability of the EOIR
Codes to effectively remedy unethical conduct on the part of
immigration judges. For example, the Codes lack both specificity and
effective enforcement mechanisms. At this time, neither existing
ethical guidelines nor EOIR's complaint procedures are adequately
protecting litigants from unethical judicial behavior. Without a more
effective method of monitoring and enforcement, the newly created
EOIR Codes of Conduct are merely words on paper.
226. Id. Canon V.
227. Id. Canon IX.
228. Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the limitations of this provision,
see infra Part 1V.C. 1.
229. Id. Commentary (emphasis added).
230. Telephone Interview with anonymous IJ (July 31, 2007).
C. Weakness in the EOIR Codes of Conduct
1. Lack of Specificity
Unlike the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the current
proposed EOIR Codes fail to define key terms necessary for proper
implementation. The most alarming example is the EOIR Codes'
failure to define the terms "bias and prejudice." The drafters did
provide an explanatory test to determine whether an "appearance of
impropriety" exists, but offered no guidance on what types of
behavior may "manifest bias" or "impair [the proceeding's]
fairness."231
In contrast, recognizing that "[a]n independent, fair and
impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice," 232 Rule
2.3 of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct specifically
addresses "Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment." Contrary to the EOIR
Codes, the Model Code specifically outlines prohibited behavior. 233
For example, Rule 2.3(B), the black letter portion of the Code,
provides a judge shall not manifest bias or prejudice, by words or
conduct, on the basis of factors "including but not limited to" race,
sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual
orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political
affiliation.2 34  Likewise, the Codes of Conduct for United States
Judges impose the responsibility to "avoid comment or behavior that
231. According to the EOIR Codes, the test to determine the appearance of
impropriety is "whether the conduct would create in the mind of a reasonable
person with knowledge of the relevant facts the belief that the immigration judge's
ability to carry out adjudicatory responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and
competence is impaired." EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary. The AILA
agrees that the EOIR Codes lack specific guidance. See Comments to Proposed
Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges and BIA Members, July 30, 2007,
available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx? docid=23005. The National
Association of Immigration Judges also took the position that the Codes lack
relevant guidance for IJs and drafted a more thorough "Code of Conduct" for
EOIR's consideration, closely based on the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
Marks Interview, supra note 66.
232. ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, pmbl.
233. See, e.g., id. Rule 2.3.
234. ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.3(B).
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can reasonably be interpreted as manifesting prejudice or bias.. .on the
basis of personal characteristics like race, sex, religion, or national
origin." 235
Moreover, the Comment to ABA Model Rule 2.3 is even
more helpful. Comment 2 to Rule 2.3 presents "examples of
manifestation of bias or prejudice," including but not limited to
"epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping;
attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating,
or hostile acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity, or
nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to personal
characteristics. "236 In addition, the Comment notes that "[e]ven
facial expressions and body language can convey to parties and
lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others an
appearance of bias and prejudice. ' 237 Accordingly, the Model Code
requires that a judge "must avoid conduct that may reasonably be
perceived as prejudiced or biased. 238
The specific examples were added to the 2007 Model Code
after witnesses urged the ABA Commission to provide illustrations
of bias, and "to better inform judges of what bias entails and what
some of the most common bias-related problems are."' 239  By
enumerating factors and offering examples of biased behavior, these
codes of conduct provide greater guidance for judges to "check
themselves" for hidden bias or prejudice in the courtroom.
Based on the recently reported behavior of immigration
judges, the ABA "examples of manifestation of bias and prejudice"
are common occurrences in immigration courts.240 Yet the EOIR
Codes of Conduct fail to list even one factor or example of
manifested bias or prejudice. This simple omission has broad
ramifications, for every individual has a different view of what the
term "bias" can entail.
Similarly, the EOIR Codes order immigration judges and
235. Id. Rule 2.3, cmt. 2.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges would benefit from
similar enumerated examples.
240. See supra note 149.
BIA members to "maintain professional competence" in the law.2 4 1
However, the EOIR Codes fail to specifically define the term
"competence" for immigration judges. As noted above, the ABA
defines judicial competence as requiring "the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary to perform a
judge's responsibilities of judicial office. 2 4 2 As an aspirational set of
rules, the ABA definition could easily be applied to immigration
judges and BIA members.
But competence might have a broader meaning for
immigration judges and BIA members, who must stay abreast of the
constantly changing world of immigration law and face unique
challenges in their daily work. Certainly, knowledge and skills in
immigration law are absolutely necessary for immigration judges; in
response to reports of judicial incompetence, the Attorney General is
implementing "immigration law exams" for judges appointed after
December 2006.243 But the Attorney General also will require
"performance evaluations" of immigration judges, which will include
an assessment as to whether new appointees "possess the appropriate
judicial temperament for the job. 24 4 This assessment suggests that
"temperament" is a significant component of competence in the
Attorney General's view.
Given these developments, EOIR should utilize its proposed
Codes of Conduct as an opportunity to expand upon the ABA
definition of judicial competence. For example, judicial competence
should include the concept of "proper judicial temperament," in
addition to knowledge of applicable law and preparation for
individual cases. The term "competence" could also be clarified by
requiring all immigration judges to pass a substantive immigration
law exam annually as part of formal training; such a requirement
would send a clear signal to immigration judges that judicial
competence requires more than merely expediting completion of
cases. In short, the term "bias" and "competence" must be more
clearly defined, particularly in an ethical scheme asking judges to
241. EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Canon V.
242. ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.5, cmt. [1].
243. DOJ Press Release, supra note 211. Because the exams will apply only to
judges appointed after December 31, 2006, existing judges are apparently exempt
from the immigration law exam. Id.
244. Id.
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regulate their own behavior.
2. Lack of Enforcement Mechanism
The efficacy of the EOIR Codes of Conduct is further limited
by its reliance on self-regulation of ethical conduct. How can an
immigration judge or BIA member, who may have years of ingrained
frustrations resulting in biases against litigants in immigration courts,
"be alert to avoid" her own behavior or accustomed demeanor? 245 In
light of the egregious behaviors outlined in the cases and statistics
above, an ethical scheme relying on judges to identify their own
incompetence, or minimize their own biases, is problematic. 246 Thus,
another limitation of the EOIR Codes, and arguably the most
damaging, is the lack of an effective external enforcement
mechanism.
Theoretically, the EOIR Codes may be enforced by the
current procedure for complaints of misconduct, for the Codes
provide that any disciplinary action must come from within the
Department of Justice. The Commentary states, "This Code does not
create any rights or interests for any party outside of the Department
of Justice, nor may violations furnish the basis for civil liability,
injunctive relief or criminal prosecution."' 247  This provision
ostensibly places responsibility on the DOJ, rather than third parties,
to monitor and enforce the Codes. 248 However, such a structure will
likely be ineffective, for the DOJ's current disciplinary structure for
IJs suffers from several weaknesses.
245. EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary.
246. See generally Randy Lee, The State of Self-Regulation of the Legal
Profession: Have We Locked the Fox in the Chicken Coop?, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
69 (2002).
247. EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary.
248. The EOIR Codes Commentary indicates that "[v]iolations of these canons
may serve as the basis for disciplinary action, but may not be used in any other
proceeding, and may not be used to challenge the rulings of an Immigration
Judge." EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary. The EOIR Codes should
instead provide an "extra layer" of oversight to prohibit conduct that might not
affect the substantive outcome of the proceeding, but is nonetheless inappropriate
and detrimental to the integrity of the immigration system.
a. Current Disciplinary Procedures Are Inadequate to Ensure
Compliance with Ethical Codes
The current disciplinary structure for immigration judges
does not adequately enforce ethical conduct on the bench. On its
face, the disciplinary process is limited by the lack of external
review. Complaints of misconduct are directed to the Assistant Chief
Immigration Judge who holds supervisory authority over the judge in
question.249  Unless referral to the Office of Professional
Responsibility is deemed warranted,250 the complaint stays with the
ACIJ; while the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge and the EOIR
Director are made aware of the complaint, it is the ACIJ who is
responsible for handling the complaint.
If the supervisor determines the complaint lacks merit, the
process ends there. Unfortunately, as members of the immigration
court system, ACIJs suffer from the same working pressures as IJs.
Moreover, if the ACIJ has a strong working relationship or is friendly
with the IJ, the ACIJ may be less likely to take disciplinary action.
The individual filing a complaint has no method of appeal, meaning
the determination of the ACIJ can effectively end the complaint
process. The OCIJ does not disclose whether action, if any, is taken
against an employee in response to a complaint.251
EOIR's complaint process has been criticized as murky and
bureaucratic by immigration experts outside of EOIR. Immigration
practitioners complain about the "uncertainty as to what actions OCIJ
takes on such complaints" as well as "what types of complaints are
likely to be of concern to OCIJ. ' ' 252 As a result, some practitioners
believe that it does "no good to complain because nothing ever
happens." 253 The issues of underreporting and the determination of
whether immigrants and practitioners are discouraged from filing
complaints against IJs are worthy of further study.
Concern also exists that the disciplinary procedure for
249. See supra Part II.D.
250. See discussion supra note 85.
251. EOIR/AILA Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions, March 7, 2002,
Question 4, Response, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/eoiraila0203.htm.
252. Id. Question 4.
253. Id.
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immigration judges is used for political purposes, rather than used to
remedy actual misconduct. EOIR holds the power to "reassign"
immigration judges to different job titles or job duties as a "matter of
management discretion. 254  Reassignment in such cases is not
deemed "disciplinary in nature if there is no loss of pay or grade"-
even if a judge is removed from the bench.255 Similarly, the
Attorney General may also reassign or remove immigration judges at
any time. 256 Given recent examples of political removals, such as
Ashcroft's removal of BIA members who were more likely to favor
immigrants, immigration judges are left with an "emerging fear that
ruling against the government in a deportation case can be hazardous
to one's job. 257
The Attorney General recently attempted to implement
another layer of ethical review with the creation of a new position:
Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for Conduct and
Professionalism.258 As noted, the person holding this position is
essentially an ACIJ serving an advisory role in issues of ethics.259
The implementation of a position focused on conduct and
professionalism could represent a promising step in the area of
ethical monitoring, as it indicates EOIR's renewed dedication to
ensuring ethical behavior on the part of immigration judges.
However, because the ACIJ for Conduct and Professionalism appears
to be merely an advisory position,26 ° ethical monitoring in EOIR
254. Legomsky, supra note 52, at 373.
255. Id. at 373-74.
256. Id.
257. Id. For this reason, many Us, scholars, and advocates are calling for the
removal of the immigration courts from the Department of Justice. See Legomsky,
supra note 52, at 373 n.14 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Immigration Judges unpublished
position paper calling for an independent immigration court), 404 ("In view of the
events of 2002 and 2003, the adjudicators can never again feel confident that they
can safely rule against the Department ."); see also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra
note 11, at 386-87 (proposing independence for immigration courts from the
Department of Justice).
258. AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 2-3. Notably, there is no
description of this position on EOIR's website.
259. See supra note 82.
260. AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 3; see also discussion
supra note 82. The author attempted to clarify the role of the ACIJ for Conduct and
Professionalism in a telephone interview with an official from EOIR Office of
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would benefit from the implementation of a multi-member panel (in
the form of the Ethics.Review Board discussed in Part V.C and D,
infra) to actually handle the complaints.
The current disciplinary structure is therefore unsatisfactory
on several levels. Because it lacks both transparency and methods for
appeal, the structure is not sufficient to monitor ethical behavior on
the part of IJs. Immigration judges working in fear of losing their
jobs if they rule against the government will be less inclined to focus
on ethics, and more inclined to focus on job security. Several
additional reforms are necessary to monitor and ensure ethical
judicial behavior in immigration courts.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The crisis on the American immigration bench is evidenced
by appellate court opinions condemning the conduct of immigration
judges, studies demonstrating statistical inconsistencies in
immigration decisions, and recurring stories of injustice reported by
individual litigants.261 From an ethical perspective, this crisis has
serious repercussions. In particular, biased and incompetent conduct
on the part of immigration judges negatively impacts the lives of
individuals seeking to remain in the United States. A larger issue is
also at hand: without significant ethical reforms to ensure proper
judicial conduct, the entire system of immigration adjudication is
flawed.
Together with circuit court judges, immigration judges are
calling for increased resources to assist with their heavy workload.2 62
Legal scholars have also recommended specific changes designed to
improve the structure of the immigration court system. For example,
Sydenham Alexander suggested a campaign to publicly identify the
"worst" IJs in order to remove them from the bench.2 63 Alexander's
Legislative and Public Affairs. EOIR Office of Legislative and Public Affairs,
supra note 219. The official confirmed the existence of the ACIJ for Conduct and
Professionalism, which is listed on EOIR's website and referenced in the April 11
AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda notes, but refused to elaborate on the actual role or
duties of this ACIJ because the position is "new." Id.
261. See sources cited supra notes 8, 11, 149.
262. See Maclean, supra note 216.
263. Alexander, supra note 8, at 45-46.
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campaign hopes to "change substantially the system that those judges
will leave behind. '264  In addition, Professors Ramji-Nogales,
Schoenholtz, and Schrag presented numerous recommendations
focused on structural change. These suggestions included (1)
bringing immigration adjudicators together to discuss the vast
inconsistencies in asylum outcomes, (2) increased training for
immigration judges with a focus on judicial temperament, (3) more
rigorous hiring standards for EOIR, (4) more resources for
immigration courts, including an increase in the number of
immigration judges, and (5) appointed counsel provided by the
government for any indigent asylum applicant litigating in
immigration court. 65 Each of these ideas has merit, and this author
supports these scholars in calling for structural reform.
Recognizing the urgency, Attorney General Gonzales
promised reforms to address judicial misconduct in immigration
courts. Many of the Attorney General's initiatives are "internal, ' 266
and it is possible that significant changes are being implemented
without publicity. Observers should closely watch EOIR and the DOJ
to guarantee completion of these improvements.
However, even if these changes are successfully
implemented, additional reforms will remain necessary to resolve the
crisis on the immigration bench. Because the focus of this article is
judicial ethics, the reforms proposed herein are intended to
specifically diminish judicial bias and incompetence. First, EOIR
should recognize the ethical duty of overworked immigration judges
to refrain from taking on new cases. In addition, EOIR should
improve ethics training and create an Ethics Review Board to work in
conjunction with the structural reforms discussed above. All three
proposals would be cost effective and fairly simple to implement, in
hopes that Justice Department officials will use them to continue
reorganizing the structure of EOIR.267
264. Id. at 46.
265. Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 380-89.
266. EOIR Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 219; see also
Authorities Delegated to the Director, supra note 38, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,674
(stating that the Attorney General's directives "are being implemented through
internal management changes within EOIR").
267. Some of these reform suggestions were submitted to the DOJ as public
comments for the proposed Codes of Conduct on July 27, 2007.
A. Ethical Obligation to Avoid Case Overloads
The EOIR Codes of Conduct could serve as a means of
support for immigration judges whose competence on the bench is
negatively impacted by excessive workloads. The ABA recently
declared that lawyers representing indigent criminal cases have an
ethical obligation to refuse accepting new clients if an excessive
caseload "prevents a lawyer from providing competent and diligent
representation to existing clients. '2 68  Admittedly, this ABA Code
provision is intended to apply to lawyers in advocacy positions, a role
very different from the job of a neutral arbiter. However, the EOIR
Codes of Conduct indicated EOIR's intent to hold immigration judges
accountable under the same standards of conduct as all attorneys in
their state of license or in the state in which they sit on the bench,
despite the fact that immigration judges and attorneys serve very
different roles in the adversarial system. 269
If immigration judges are to be held to the same standards of
conduct as attorneys, the EOIR Codes of Conduct should draw an
analogy from the ABA rules: the EOIR Codes should provide that an
overworked immigration judge without the time or resources
necessary to decide cases in a thorough and competent manner has an
ethical obligation to avoid taking on new cases.
This provision would certainly be controversial in light of
political and practical pressure to decide immigration cases
expediently. Indeed, such action might require organization on the
part of immigration judges themselves, much like public defenders
going on strike to highlight their lack of resources. 270 If immigration
judges refused to take more cases than they could fairly and
adequately handle, their action would have two immediate effects: it
268. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441
(2006); see also ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 2 (2002)
("A lawyer's workload must be controlled so that each matter can be handled
competently.").
269. EOIR CODES, supra note 217, Canon III.
270. See Brandon Buskey, When Public Defenders Strike: Exploring How
Public Defenders Can Utilize the Lessons of Public Choice Theory to Become
Effective Political Actors, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 533 (2007), available at
http://www.hlrponline.com/vollno2/buskey.pdf
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would signal to the federal government that the problem of
inadequate judicial resources is closely aligned with judicial
competence, and it would empower immigration judges to publicly
value ethical decision-making. 27' In this way, the proposed EOIR
Codes of Conduct could potentially serve as catalysts inspiring
further ethical reform.
B. Improved Ethics Training
As it revises its code of conduct, EOIR must clarify the
applicable ethical rules for immigration judges. It is simply
unrealistic to expect an overworked group of judges to continuously
follow changes in multiple sets of rules and guidelines. Strictly
defining applicable ethical rules will enable judges to follow a clearer
standard of conduct.
This unified standard should be enhanced by improving
training for immigration judges and BIA members on ethics-related
issues. Budgetary concerns have limited training conferences in
recent years, including 2008,272 but the crisis in immigration courts
demonstrates a renewed need for formal ethics training.
At a minimum, immigration judges are currently required to
attend one hour of training per year on ethics issues.273 EOIR
recognized the need for additional training for immigration judges,
and indicated its intent to provide "extended training" for
immigration judges on "substantive legal issues" and
"professionalism." 274 The EOIR Director's job responsibilities now
include providing "comprehensive, continuing training" for
immigration judges to "promote the quality and consistency of
271. The potential effectiveness of this reform strategy is worthy of further
consideration. Note that IJs employing this technique would need to ensure their
actions are interpreted as a justified cry for reform, rather than as an outright
rebellion jeopardizing their job security.
272. See discussion supra notes 112, 113. Immigration judges were "shocked
and disappointed" to learn that the 2008 training had been cancelled and warned
that "the results of this [cancellation], without some accommodations, would be
disastrous." NAIJ Letter, supra note 113.
273. 5 C.F.R. § 2638.704 (2007).
274. AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 2.
adjudications."' 275
Assuming that a more specific version of the Codes of
Conduct is in place, immigration judges should be trained to
appreciate the importance of each of these codes. In addition to the
training on judicial temperament suggested by Professors Ramji-
Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, 276  IJs should be reminded that
neutrality, competence, and general adherence to judicial ethics rules
are critical parts of their jobs on the bench.
Training need not only occur on the national level. Local
offices should offer seminars on judicial ethics, much like continuing
legal education training for practicing attorneys. In addition to the
value for individual judges, the DOJ would gain valuable public
relations benefits. In short, the implementation of improved formal
ethics trainings would be a low-cost, but highly advantageous, reform
for immigration judges.
C. Creation of an EOIR Ethics Review Board
In 2006, as part of his ongoing structural reforms in
immigration courts, the Attorney General announced he would
address the failings of the IJ disciplinary process by implementing
"improved complaint procedures for inappropriate conduct by
adjudicators. 277  To adequately repair this process, the Attorney
General should create an "Ethics Review Board" ("ERB") to
supervise the courtroom conduct of immigration judges. Using the
clarified EOIR Codes of Conduct as a governing standard, the Ethics
Review Board could hear complaints of inappropriate behavior
brought by litigants, practitioners, circuit court judges, or members of
275. Authorities Delegated to the Director, supra note 38, at 53,677 (codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(vii) (2007)). Notably, the cancellation of the 2008
training conference for immigration judges "is in direct contravention to the
measure of improved training announced by the Attorney General." NAIJ Letter,
supra note 113.
276. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 382 (recommending training
for IJs to include "counseling on impartiality, avoiding stereotyping, and not taking
personally the misconduct that the judges sometimes encounter from people who
are desperate to remain in the United States").
277. DOJ Press Release, supra note 211. The Attorney General delegated this
duty to the EOIR Director. See Authorities Delegated to Director, supra note 38, at
53,677 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. Part 1003.0 (b)(viii)).
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the public. The ERB could then act to discipline judges for unethical
behavior, with the understanding that a behavioral complaint will not
impact the substantive outcome of an immigration judge's
decision.2 78
D. Structure of the Ethics Review Board
The ERB structure would consist of a panel of reviewers,
with a system for appeals if either party disagrees with the ERB
determination. The ERB structure would also provide for public
accountability in the form of public reports. Useful analogies for this
structure can be found in the process for adjudicating disciplinary
complaints against federal judges and California state judges.
Federal judges, state judges and administrative law judges
differ from immigration judges in notable ways, including the
procedural differences in the appointment processes as discussed in
Part II.B, supra. In addition, unlike judges working within the
Judicial Branch, immigration judges operate under the Executive
Branch of government. Despite these differences, federal judges,
state judges, administrative law judges, and immigration judges all
assume the role of a "neutral arbiter" in adjudicatory proceedings.
Thus, specific elements of the federal and state judicial disciplinary
structure could serve as effective models for the disciplinary structure
for immigration judges. 279
1. Analogy: Disciplinary Structure for the Federal Judiciary
Federal judges must comply with the Code of Conduct for
United States judges. The ethical standards embodied in the Code,
which are intended to have a "preventive" effect, offer affirmative
278. The proper avenue for review of inappropriate behavior that substantially
affects the outcome of the case is a legal appeal to the circuit courts. The ERB
focus will be inappropriate judicial conduct unrelated to an applicant's substantive
claim. Similarly, the disciplinary structure for federal judges provides for dismissal
if a complaint is "directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling."
28 U.S.C. § 352 (b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
279. An administrative law judge may be disciplined by his or her employing
agency only for "good cause." 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1989). To discipline an ALJ, the
employing agency must initiate formal proceedings with an independent agency,
the Merit Systems Protections Board. Id.
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guidelines for appropriate judicial behavior.2 8 0 Although the drafters
of the Code did not intend that disciplinary action would be
appropriate for every violation of the Code's provisions, this Code
"may provide standards of conduct for application" in disciplinary
proceedings against federal judges. 28 1
The procedure to file complaints against federal judges for
misconduct is governed by the "Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. 28 2 Elements of this procedure
serve as excellent models for a similar system for immigration
judges, particularly regarding the methods of appeal for persons
filing complaints and multi-member panels of reviewers addressing
complaints.
Under the Act, a person wishing to bring a charge against a
federal judge under this standard may file a complaint with the clerk
of the court of appeals, who then reports the complaint to the chief
judge of the circuit. 2 3  The initial responsibility to investigate
complaints lies with the chief judge, who must review all complaints
,,84 Afe reiwn th
and may conduct a "limited inquiry. After reviewing the
complaint, the chief judge may dismiss the complaint, resolve it
280. In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1995).
281. CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES, supra note 108, Canon 1, Commentary. The
standard for disciplinary procedures under the Act is whether a judge's conduct was
"prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts," or whether a "federal judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by
reason of a mental or physical disability." 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2007). This
disciplinary structure could be strengthened by specifically including violations of
the Codes of Conduct for United States Judges as a basis for discipline. However,
extended analysis of the disciplinary structure for the federal judiciary is beyond
the scope of this article.
282. TERRY EASTLAND ET AL., ETHICS IN THE COURTS: POLICING BEHAVIOR IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest) (1990).
Nine years later, Congress enacted the "Ethics Reform Act," which regulates the
extrajudicial conduct of judges. Id. The Act is now codified in Title 28 of the
United States Code.
283. 28 U.S.C. § 351 (2000). This provision applies to circuit judges, district
judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. Id. § 351(d). Congress mandated
that the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit establish similar procedures for the filing of
complaints "with respect to the conduct of any judge of such court and for the
investigation and resolution of such complaints." 28 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
284. 28 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000).
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informally, or appoint a special committee to investigate the
allegations.2 85
This procedure is similar to the current disciplinary
procedure for immigration judges, in which an ACIJ with supervisory
authority reviews and acts upon allegations of misconduct. Unlike the
current IJ procedure, however, the disciplinary inquiry for federal
judges does not end with a single individual's determination. Rather,
if either party disagrees with the chief judge's resolution of a
complaint, review is available to the Judicial Council of the circuit.
The Judicial Council may then act in a number of ways,
including ordering additional investigation, dismissing the complaint,
ordering that no new cases be assigned to the misbehaving judge, and
censuring or reprimanding the judge either publicly or privately.2 86
A party disagreeing with the action taken by the Judicial Council has
yet another layer of appeal, for any party may petition the Judicial
Conference of the United States to hear the case. 287  In addition,
members of the Judicial Council may themselves refer a complaint to
the Judicial Conference of the United States if the case requires
further disciplinary action. 88
Thus, a disciplinary complaint against a federal judge may be
subject to several layers of appeal. Congress's clearly organized
procedures relating to the investigation of misbehaving federal judges
indicates its concern about judicial ethics. In contrast to the
ambiguity experienced by complainants filing behavioral allegations
against immigration judges, complaints and investigative procedures
for the federal judiciary are well developed and opinions of Judicial
Councils are publicly available. 289 Accordingly, the disciplinary
process for federal judges serves as a useful model to reform EOIR's
285. Id. §§ 352, 353.
286. 28 U.S.C. § 354 (2000). Notably, § 354 details various actions which may
be taken by the Judicial Council, but imposes limits on the Judicial Council
regarding removals. Id. § 354(a)(3). The Judicial Council does not have the power
to remove an Article III judge from the bench. Id. § 354 (a)(3)(A).
287. Id. § 357.
288. Id. § 354(b)(1). If the Judicial Council determines that a judge's action
may constitute grounds for impeachment, or is not amenable to resolution by the
Judicial Council, the Council must refer the case to the Judicial Conference. Id. §
354(b)(2).
289. See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.2d 320 (9th Cir.
1995).
complaint procedures.
2. Analogy: Disciplinary Process for California State Judges
Article III judges enjoy life tenure, which places them in a
different situation than both state judges and immigration judges.
Thus, while certain components of the disciplinary procedure for
Article III judges should be applied to immigration judges, the
disposition of complaints against judges should be handled
differently. California's judicial disciplinary process adjudicates
complaints against state judges in a manner placing a premium on
accountability, a method which should be adopted by EOIR.
The State of California Commission on Judicial Performance
("CJP") receives complaints from "anyone"-including litigants,
lawyers, members of the public, other judges, and court staff.290
Unlike the complaint process at EOIR, every person who files a
complaint with the CJP will receive notification in writing of the
CJP's action on a complaint. 291  After the CJP investigates a
complaint, "the Commission has several options.' ' 292  If the
investigation revealed no misconduct on the part of the judge, the
CJP will close the case and notify the complainant of the
dismissal.293 If minor misconduct was discovered on the part of the
judge, the CJP could "issue an 'advisory letter' to the judge,"
advising caution or expressing disapproval of the conduct at issue.294
For more serious misconduct, the CJP may issue a "private
admonishment," which is designed "to bring problems to a judge's
attention at an early stage in the hope that the misconduct will not be
repeated or escalate. 295  These confidential proceedings are not
released to the public.
For very serious misconduct, the California judicial
disciplinary process uses public disclosure to hold judges
290. State of Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, How to File a Complaint,
http://cjp.ca.gov/filingacomp.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
291. Id.
292. State of Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, Action the Commission
Can Take, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/200 1cases.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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accountable. Cases involving persistent and pervasive misconduct
may result in a "public admonishment," or the more serious "public
censure." 296  Public admonishments and public censures are both
notifications describing the conduct and the CJP's findings, which are
sent to the judge and also made available to the press and the
public. 297 This system emphasizes public accountability: since state
judges are public officials, the public has the right to know when
judges are misbehaving.
A similar public accountability system should be instituted
for immigration judges accused of serious misconduct. Public
admonishment or public censure for immigration judges engaging in
egregious unethical behavior would add an effective layer of
accountability to EOIR's judicial structure, particularly in light of
renewed public attention on judicial misconduct.
E. Proposed Disciplinary Structure for Immigration Judges
The creation of an Ethics Review Board adopting elements of
the disciplinary process for federal judges and California state judges
would provide much-needed clarity to EOIR's disciplinary process.
First, the standards of ethical conduct for immigration judges should
be simplified: complaints should be based upon violations of revised
and more specific Codes of Conduct. Persons wishing to allege
violations of the Codes may file a complaint with the EOIR Ethics
Review Board. To remedy the concerns raised by allowing one
person with supervisory authority to review and dismiss a complaint,
the ERB should consist of a five to nine member panel. In this way,
enforcement of the Codes of Conduct would be the responsibility of a
third-party panel. A panel review with a detached group of
individuals is a more appropriate method of handling complaints,
since a "panel is less likely to make a mistake than is a single
[individual] .298
The members of the ERB would conduct an investigation
similar to the inquiry undertaken by a federal chief judge in response
to a complaint. Based on this inquiry, following California's model,
296. Id.
297. Id. Judges have the right to ask the California Supreme Court "to review
an admonishment, censure, removal or involuntary retirement determination." Id.
298. Cruz, supra note 11, at 507.
the ERB could have several options for disposition of the complaint.
The ERB could (1) dismiss the complaint, (2) resolve the complaint
informally through mediation or another form of alternative dispute
resolution, (3) take action on a complaint through an advisory letter
or private admonishment, or (4) reprimand an IJ for serious
misconduct through public admonishment or public censure.
Regardless of the ERB's determination, two factors must be
present. First, if either party disagrees with the ERB's resolution,
appeal must be available. Like the petition for review of a federal
chief judge's decision to the Judicial Council, the ERB's resolution
should be appealable to the EOIR Office of General Counsel. This
process deliberately skips the current evaluators of complaints
against immigration judges (the ACIJ, OCIJ, and EOIR Director),
since their failure to adequately enforce proper behavior on the
immigration bench has contributed to the current ethical crisis. The
EOIR Office of General Counsel may refer a complaint alleging
misconduct to the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility or the
Office of the Inspector General. Alternatively, either party seeking a
final review should file an appeal to the Office of the Attorney
General, who holds ultimate responsibility for the actions of
immigration judges.
Second, to alleviate the uncertainty of the current process for
complainants, the ERB must create a written record of its
investigation and decision-making process. This detailed record need
not be made available to the public, but should be accessible to the
complaining party and the judge whose conduct is in question.
If the ERB chooses to reprimand an IJ through public
admonishment or public censure, much like California's disciplinary
system, the names of these judges should be available on the EOIR
website. In addition, a statistical report regarding complaints of
unethical misconduct against immigration judges must be made
public for accountability purposes. This public report could take the
form of California's CJP statistics, which compile the numbers of
new complaints considered by the CJP, investigations commenced,
and ultimate dispositions of cases.299 California also compiles
summaries of actions taken against state judges describing the details
299. See CJP, 10-Year Summary of Commission Activity, http://
cjp.ca.gov/TenYearStats.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
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of misconduct resulting in discipline. 300 These annual summaries are
useful for judges concerned about avoiding discipline for similar
behavior. Privacy concerns could prevent the full, detailed
investigation record of the ERB from being publicly released. At a
minimum, however, public reports should include information
regarding how many complaints of ethical misconduct are filed each
year against immigration judges, examples of the types of complaints
filed, and how such complaints are resolved.
F. Benefits of Ethics Review Board
The creation of an Ethics Review Board would provide
several benefits to the DOJ. Like the complaint procedure for federal
judges under the Judicial Councils Act, this system offers several
methods of appeal and multiple reviewers for each complaint filed,
ensuring that complaints are handled properly. Also, IJs will be
aware that unethical behavior, particularly biased behavior against
litigants, will have public consequences. The mere possibility of
public accountability could be enough to deter some judges from
acting in an unethical manner, for the threat of public embarrassment
will likely encourage most Js to act more carefully on the bench. As
judicial performance improves, litigants may be less inclined to file
appeals to the BIA and circuit courts. In this way, a more ethical
judiciary at the IJ level could help alleviate the "surge" in the circuit
courts.
30 1
Perhaps more importantly, those IJs who continue to act
improperly will actually be held accountable for their behavior.
Rather than relying on the circuit courts, reporters, or legal scholars
to identify "bad apples" among IJs and BIA members, EOIR and the
DOJ could recognize, discipline, and remove biased or incompetent
judges before their behavior impacts large numbers of applicants. As
300. See CJP, 2006 Private Discipline Summaries, http://
www.cjp.ca.gov/2001privdisc.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008); CJP, 2006 Public
Discipline, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/commcases.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
301. Seipp & Feal, supra note 18, at 2012 (circuit courts are taking time to
"graphically expose the unfortunate number of glaringly defective decisions"
rendered by IJs). With more ethical behavior on the bench, the number of
"glaringly defective" decisions will hopefully decrease, freeing the circuit courts to
consider more substantive legal issues.
a result, the ethical integrity of immigration judges and BIA members
would noticeably improve.
In addition, this improved layer of accountability serves a
separate purpose for the Justice Department: sorely needed public
relations benefits. Creating an Ethics Review Board, in addition to
enhanced ethics training for judges, would demonstrate the DOJ's
renewed commitment to ensuring ethical conduct. Moreover, if
litigants entering immigration courts know they will be guaranteed a
"professional manner" 30 2  and "impartial treatment, '30 3  and also
know that a systematic method for complaints is available if they
encounter otherwise, a more positive public perception of EOIR and
its judges could be restored.
Creation of an Ethics Review Board would also be cost
effective. There is no need to hire large numbers to staff the ERB;
indeed, a five- to nine-member panel would be sufficient as a start.
Lawyers from the DOJ Office of Government Ethics, who are trained
in ethics standards and advise attorneys throughout the department on
ethical issues, would be well suited for the position. Alternatively,
the ERB could consist of a variety of members-including
practitioners or advocates from both sides of the immigration debate-
to assure a balanced consideration of complaints. Also, members
would serve one to two-year terms on the ERB, to minimize the time
commitment required for each member. The low-cost creation of a
small board, guaranteeing accountability for judges' violations of
EOIR's own Codes of Conduct, will go a long way toward restoring
the fairness and integrity of the immigration system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The crisis in the immigration courts warrants examination
from the perspective of judicial ethics. Increasing reports of biased or
incompetent conduct on the immigration bench raise particular
concerns about the ability of the immigration court system to
properly adjudicate cases. But these pervasive ethical problems also
present an unparalleled opportunity for reform.
The Attorney General's pending proposals to redress
302. EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Canon X.
303. Id. Canon VI.
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improper conduct on the part of immigration judges indicates
recognition of the problem and government willingness to improve.
However, some of the pending reforms, such as the EOIR Codes of
Conduct, suffer from significant flaws undermining their power to
ensure unbiased and competent behavior on the immigration bench.
Numerous effective reform proposals have been articulated
in recent months, and this author joins legal scholars, appellate
judges, and practitioners in supporting structural changes. 30 4  To
reframe the ongoing discussion from an ethical perspective, this
article proposes three practical reforms designed to actively promote
ethical conduct for immigration judges. For a start, the EOIR Codes
of Conduct could be used as a springboard to address challenges
facing immigration judges, such as excessive caseloads. Genuine
improvement will also require the investment of more time and
money for training courses on judicial ethics. Additionally, a panel of
reviewers in the form of an Ethics Review Board will develop
accountability and consequences for judicial misconduct. The ERB
will take responsibility for monitoring complaints away from a single
individual, and place the burden more fairly on a multi-member
panel. Such changes would benefit not only individuals litigating in
immigration court, but would also signify the Department of Justice's
renewed commitment to ethical conduct in the courtroom. It is hoped
that expanded recognition of the ethical repercussions of this crisis
will soon translate into meaningful change-for litigants like Mr. Tun
and Mr. Elias, and for immigration judges seeking to do their jobs
well.
304. See sources cited in supra note 11; see also supra Part V.
